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INTRODUCTION 
The manner in which information is shared has changed dramatically since 
the late 1960s, when the Supreme Court issued two seminal free speech rul-
ings: Pickering v. Board of Education and Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District.1 In Pickering, the Court held in favor of a teacher 
who had written a letter to the local newspaper that was critical of his school 
board.2 The Court held that teachers generally have a right to speak as citizens 
on matters of public concern.3 The Pickering Court, however, stipulated that 
the speech rights of teachers are not unlimited; they must be balanced against 
the rights of the state as an employer to efficiently run the schools.4 In Tinker, 
 
1  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Pickering v. Bd. of 
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Pickering and Tinker represented radical departures from the 
previously held notions about the extent to which the Constitution protects the interests of 
teachers or pupils in public schools. Up until Tinker, the dominant view was that, because 
educators acted in place of parents when students are at school, they naturally enjoy the 
same unfettered right to discipline students that parents do. See State v. Pendergrass, 19 
N.C. 365, 366 (1837). In State v. Pendergrass, the Court stated: “[t]he teacher is the substi-
tute of the parent” and “is invested with his power.” Id. As to the educators’ relationship 
with their state employers, the right/privilege distinction, articulated by Justice Oliver Wen-
dell Holmes in 1892, had long been a significant barrier to advancing the free speech rights 
of public educators. See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892). 
In McAuliffe, a case that dealt with a policeman who had been fired for engaging in political 
speech, Justice Holmes summed up the right/privilege distinction as follows: “The petitioner 
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a po-
liceman.” Id. 
2  Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574–75. 
3  Id. at 572. 
4  Watt Lesley Black, Jr., When Teachers Go Viral: Balancing Institutional Efficacy Against 
the First Amendment Rights of Public Educators in the Age of Facebook, 82 MO. L. REV. 
51, 90 (2017) (see flow chart on page 90, which describes the Pickering Balancing test in 
terms of six considerations: “Did the employee’s speech: [1] breach confidentiality[;] [2] 
undermine the superior/subordinate relationship[;] [3] interfere with the orderly operations 
of the school[;] [4] interfere with his/her ability to continue to function effectively on the 
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the Court held in favor of students who had worn black armbands to school in 
protest of the Vietnam War, holding that students have First Amendment rights 
in school so long as their speech does not cause material or substantial disrup-
tion or an invasion of the rights of other students.5 
The student speech in Tinker had no negative impact on the work of the 
school, nor did it interfere in any way with the rights of others.6 The same is 
true of Pickering’s letter to the editor, which triggered very little public reac-
tion outside of the school board members who felt personally targeted.7 In 
2019, it is much less likely that such speech will go unnoticed. Unlike in 1969, 
virtually everyone now has the means to quickly and easily distribute expres-
sive content throughout their communities and far beyond. Electronic speech 
has the potential to “go viral,” reaching an audience far larger than the speaker 
may have ever intended. The expanded reach of student or educator speech has 
exponentially increased its potential to cause disruption to the school environ-
ment. 
This enhanced ability of students and educators to broadcast their expres-
sion online has posed unprecedented legal and practical challenges. The public 
launch of Facebook in 2006 triggered an expansion in the use of social media, 
which is now widespread among all ages and sectors of society.8 According to 
a 2018 Pew Research study, 95 percent of American “teens have access to a 
smartphone” and 45 percent of the teens surveyed claim to be online “almost 
constantly.”9 Eighty-five percent of the teens surveyed are regular users of 
YouTube, followed closely in use by Instagram and Snapchat.10 The improved 
technology has allowed student speech to be more influential both on matters 
subject to serious debate11 and on cruel or disparaging speech, such as cyber-
bullying.12 The modern school administrator has been forced to struggle with 
the resultant fallout. 
Adults are also prevalent users of social media. Sixty-eight percent of 
American adults are on Facebook, with even heavier usage among young 
 
job[;] [5] [constitute a] knowingly or recklessly ma[d]e false statement[][;] [or] [6] provide 
evidence of a lack of employee’s fitness for duty”). 
5  Tinker, 391 U.S. at 504, 508. 
6  Id. at 509. 
7  Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570. 
8  See Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (June 12, 2019), http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
fact-sheet/social-media/ [https://perma.cc/843N-FTQY]. 
9  MONICA ANDERSON & JINGJING JIANG, TEENS, SOCIAL MEDIA & TECHNOLOGY 2 (2018). 
10  Id. 
11  Gary Younge, What Happened Next? How Teenage Shooting Survivor David Hogg Be-
came a Political Leader, GUARDIAN (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/news/ 
2018/dec/12/gun-control-activist-david-hogg-parkland-people-dying 
[https://perma.cc/WV8Q-SHT5]. 
12  See Monica Anderson, A Majority of Teens Have Experienced Some Form of Cyberbully-
ing, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 27, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/09/27/a-majority-of-
teens-have-experienced-some-form-of-cyberbullying/ [https://perma.cc/W36E-NL3X]. 
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adults in their twenties—the age range of many new teachers.13 Social media 
use by teachers has made their private lives, which have always been subject to 
heightened scrutiny relative to the general public, more publicly accessible 
than ever before.14 Public confidence in the “fitness” of those who work most 
closely with their children is essential to the effective functioning of a school 
district and, when an educator expresses himself or herself online in a contro-
versial manner, schools may worry that, absent corrective action against that 
employee, trust may be eroded within their communities. This often presents a 
conundrum to practicing school administrators who are seeking to balance the 
efficacy of their school systems against the legitimate rights of their employ-
ees. 
In matters involving both students and school employees, the Supreme 
Court has given a rudimentary roadmap for resolving the conflicts, but the 
Court’s precedents do not easily translate to the digital age. School administra-
tors lack a consistent framework for determining when an employee’s online 
speech can provide the basis for negative employment action. As to matters in-
volving students, the existing body of case law doesn’t provide school admin-
istrators a sufficient level of certainty that their disciplinary decisions will 
strike the appropriate balance between the maintenance of discipline at school 
and respect for students’ First Amendment rights. 
This article examines the developing law around the First Amendment and 
electronic speech in public education and identifies the important themes per-
taining to both student and educator speech. It also highlights emerging issues 
and their implications for educational administrators as they wrestle to make 
legally and ethically defensible decisions related to discipline of both students 
and school personnel. 
Part I will review the relevant Supreme Court precedent regarding the First 
Amendment rights of both students and teachers in public schools, from the 
historic Pickering and Tinker decisions in 1968 and 1969 through the most re-
cent decisions related to student and public employee expression. Part II will 
focus on public employee expression and how the lower federal courts have 
applied Supreme Court precedent in cases involving electronic speech. Part III 
will focus on important developments in lower federal courts as they have at-
tempted to apply Supreme Court precedent to cases involving student speech. 
Part IV will pull together themes that emerge across both student and educator 
 
13  AARON SMITH & MONICA ANDERSON, SOCIAL MEDIA USE IN 2018 2 (2018); Pew Re-
search Ctr., supra note 8. 
14  See Marka B. Fleming et al., Morals Clauses for Educators in Secondary and Postsec-
ondary Schools: Legal Applications and Constitutional Concerns, 2009 B.Y.U. EDUC. & 
L.J. 67, 70 (2009) (arguing that teachers are so influential that parents, legislators, and the 
general citizenry historically held expectations that they “serve as good examples for their 
young charges.”); see also Mike Simpson, Social Networking Nightmares: Cyberspeak No 
Evil, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/home/38324.htm [https://perma.cc/J3X7- 
PF8X] (last visited Nov. 17, 2019) (suggesting that the popularity of social media has “en-
gendered a prurient interest in teachers’ ‘private’ lives”). 
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speech cases and examine the implications for practice in both the student and 
employee management realms. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
A. The Public-School Educator’s Speech Rights 
The Supreme Court first waded into the issue of First Amendment rights 
inside the public schools in 1968.15 Marvin Pickering was a public high school 
teacher who was terminated as a result of writing a letter to the editor of a local 
paper.16 Pickering’s letter was critical of the board’s use of funds from a 1961 
bond election and also contained accusations that the superintendent had inap-
propriately coerced employees’ support of a local school-related referendum.17 
The Board of Trustees believed that Pickering had cast aspersions on their 
“motives, honesty, integrity, truthfulness, responsibility and competence.”18 As 
a result, they terminated Pickering’s employment.19 
The Court ruled in Pickering that, while educators do have First Amend-
ment rights to speak as citizens on matters of public concern, the state also has 
the right as a public employer to provide government services with basic effi-
ciency.20 When an educator engages in speech that is sufficiently disruptive to 
school business, then the balance tilts in favor of the employer.21 
The Court considered three circumstances under which school administra-
tors might have been able to impose discipline without violating the First 
Amendment. First, had Pickering’s letter breached confidentiality or under-
mined important workplace relationships, he might legally have been subjected 
to job-related discipline.22 But Pickering did not report directly to, or regularly 
interact with, board members or the superintendent; therefore the Court did not 
find that his letter interfered with any working relationships.23 Second, had the 
letter interfered with school operations or damaged Pickering’s ability to con-
tinue to effectively function in his job, he also could have been subject to dis-
cipline.24 With the exception of the board members themselves, however, most 
in the community had greeted Pickering’s letter with “massive apathy and total 
disbelief.”25 Outside of upsetting the superintendent and trustees, the letter had 
no impact on Pickering’s job effectiveness or to the functioning of the school 
 
15  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564 (1968). 
16  Id. 
17  Id. at 564, 576. 
18  Id. at 567. 
19  Id. at 563. 
20  Id. at 568. 
21  See Black, supra note 4, at 80. 
22  Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570–73. 
23  Id. at 570. 
24  Id. at 572–73. 
25  Id. at 570 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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system in general.26 Finally, had Pickering knowingly shared false information, 
he might have been subject to discipline.27 But while the letter contained some 
inaccurate information, there was no evidence presented that Pickering reck-
lessly made false claims.28 Under the particular circumstances, Pickering’s let-
ter survived what has come to be known as the Pickering Balancing Test.29 
In 1983, the Court issued another ruling that would impact the First 
Amendment expression rights of public educators. In Connick v Myers, the 
Court held that not all expressive activities of public employees merit First 
Amendment protection.30 Connick v. Myers did not involve an educator; in-
stead it arose out of an employment dispute in an urban district attorney’s of-
fice.31 Sheila Myers worked as an assistant district attorney in New Orleans.32 
In response to a pending transfer to another section of the criminal court, My-
ers prepared and distributed a survey to approximately fifteen other assistant 
district attorneys, soliciting input on office morale, confidence in supervisors, 
and whether there should be an official “grievance committee.”33 Upon learn-
ing that Myers had distributed the survey, District Attorney Harry Connick 
terminated her.34 Myers successfully argued in federal district court that the 
termination violated her First Amendment free speech rights.35 Upon appeal to 
the Fifth Circuit, the district court’s decision was affirmed.36 
The Supreme Court, however, viewed this case much differently than the 
lower courts. In the Court’s view, Myers’s survey was notably different from 
Pickering’s letter in that it addressed matters almost exclusively of private in-
terest.37 If employee speech does not address a matter of public concern, an 
employer’s decision to impose discipline should not be a judicial concern.38 
But, in addition to distinguishing a difference between the public and private 
nature of the content of Myers’s speech, the Court also noted a significant dif-
ference related to the capacity of the speakers in these two cases. In contrast to 
Marvin Pickering, who wrote his letter as a private citizen, Myers was speak-
ing in the capacity of an employee when she distributed a work-related survey 
 
26  Id. at 567, 572–73. 
27  Id. at 569. 
28  Id. at 572. 
29  Joseph O. Oluwole, The Pickering Balancing Test and Public Employment-Free Speech 
Jurisprudence: The Approaches of Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals, 46 DUQ. L. REV. 133, 
135 (2008). 
30  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983). 
31  Id. at 140. 
32  Id. 
33  Id. at 140–41. 
34  Id. at 141. 
35  Id. at 141–42. 
36  Id. at 142. 
37  Id. at 154. It is important to note that, while Myers was speaking in the capacity of an 
employee, she was not actually doing her job when she was speaking. 
38  Id. at 146. 
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throughout her office.39 Writing for the majority in Connick, Justice Byron 
White explained: 
[W]hen a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public con-
cern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent 
the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in 
which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency 
allegedly in reaction to the employee’s behavior.40 
The Court gave minimal guidance on the issue of how a public employer 
should determine whether an employee is speaking as a citizen on a matter of 
public concern: “Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public 
concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given 
statement. . . .”41 The Court concluded that the content of Myers’s survey dealt 
primarily with private workplace concerns.42 With respect to form and context, 
the Court focused heavily on Myers’s motivation, which it viewed as primarily 
self-serving.43 Rather than seeking to blow the whistle on incompetent or cor-
rupt practices within the district attorney’s office, Myers was acting out of her 
dissatisfaction with her impending transfer, hoping to “gather ammunition for 
another round of controversy with her superiors.”44 
The Court’s decision in Connick set up two distinct categories of speech: 
that of an employee on a matter of private interest and that of a citizen on a 
matter of public concern. And yet the Court was vague in terms of how to dis-
tinguish between these two categories. In effect, the Court’s decision in Con-
nick significantly narrowed the scope of public employee speech rights, creat-
ing a “threshold test” through which employee speech must pass before it is 
evaluated under Pickering. As a result, employee speech that fails to meet this 
test of public concern is no longer under the umbrella of First Amendment pro-
tection.45 
In 1987, the Court clarified what qualifies as a public concern under Con-
nick. In Rankin v. McPherson,46 Deputy Constable Ardith McPherson was 
fired after she was overheard making a distasteful remark regarding the at-
tempted assassination of President Ronald Reagan.47 When she learned that 
Reagan had been shot, McPherson commented to her boyfriend, who also was 
 
39  Id. at 154. 
40  Id. at 147 (emphasis added). 
41  Id. at 147–48. 
42  Id. at 154. 
43  Id. at 148. 
44  Id. 
45  See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 449 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985), in which the Sixth Circuit relied upon Connick in order to rule 
against a high school guidance counselor for revealing her bisexuality to co-workers, despite 
a lack of evidence that her revelation created any type of disruption. The circuit court held 
that the speech was of a personal interest and, under Connick, unprotected. Id. The Supreme 
Court denied certiorari. 
46  Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987). 
47  Id. at 381–82. 
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employed by the constable: “[I]f they go for him again, I hope they get him.”48 
A co-worker reported the comment to McPherson’s supervisor, and she was 
fired.49 The Court held that McPherson’s speech dealt with the life and death 
of the president, a matter of inherent public concern, and therefore protected by 
the First Amendment.50 
Perhaps more interestingly, a concurring opinion in Rankin raised the pos-
sibility that Connick should not disqualify purely private employee speech 
from First Amendment protection. Justice Lewis Powell, in his concurrence, 
argued that the Connick “public concern” test was unnecessary and inappropri-
ate because McPherson’s remark was part of a purely private conversation be-
tween her and her boyfriend.51 McPherson could have had no way of reasona-
bly knowing that her comment would have reached anyone other than the other 
party involved in the conversation. Further, there was little likelihood that her 
remark would be disruptive in any way. “The risk that a single, offhand com-
ment directed to only one other worker will lower morale, disrupt the work 
force, or otherwise undermine the mission of the office borders on the fanci-
ful,” explained Justice Powell.52 
In 1995, the Court dealt with a case involving an ex ante restriction on the 
speech rights of public employees and chose to side-step Connick altogether. 
United States v. National Treasury Employees’ Union (NTEU) involved a chal-
lenge to a section of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, which banned federal em-
ployees from accepting compensation for writing articles or making speech-
es.53 The provision was intended to be an ethical safeguard, protecting the 
integrity of both government workers and the government itself.54 The parties 
challenging the prohibition comprised individual employees and large unions 
who argued that the measure would have a chilling impact on their private 
speech, an argument with which the Court agreed.55 “With few exceptions,” 
Justice Stevens explained, “the content of respondents’ messages has nothing 
to do with their jobs and does not even arguably have any adverse impact on 
the efficiency of the offices in which they work.”56 Thus, the Act violated the 
First Amendment rights of federal employees. 
In 2004, the Court once again relied on Connick in upholding the termina-
tion of a police officer in San Diego after he refused an order to stop produc-
ing, starring in, and selling adult videos online.57 The officer sold his videos on 
 
48  Id. at 381. 
49  Id. at 381–82. 
50  Id. at 385–87. 
51  Id. at 393 (Powell, J., concurring). 
52  Id. 
53  United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emp.’s Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995). 
54  Id. at 472. 
55  Id. at 465, 469. 
56  Id. at 465. 
57  City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78 (2004). 
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the “adults-only” section of Ebay.58 He also sold police-related items, one of 
which was an official San Diego police uniform, something that ultimately 
caught the attention of department officials.59 
The department initiated a termination proceeding after the officer refused 
to fully comply with a directive to cease and desist his online enterprise.60 The 
officer filed suit in federal court alleging a violation of his rights under the 
First Amendment, but the district court dismissed his case, holding that his 
speech was not of a public concern, and therefore unprotected.61 The Ninth 
Circuit reversed, however, relying upon the NTEU decision to argue that this 
was purely private and non-disruptive speech unrelated to his job duties.62 The 
Court viewed the officer’s online business as essentially different than the 
speech at issue in NTEU, which was unrelated to, and had no impact on, the 
work or business of the employer.63 In contrast, the officer’s videos were con-
nected to his work as a policeman “in a way injurious to his employer.”64 Vid-
eos depicting a police officer “performing indecent acts while in the course of 
official duties” would cause anyone who might view them to develop serious 
doubts with regard to the professionalism and mission of the San Diego police 
department.65 
In the 2006 decision of Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court was forced to grap-
ple with a type of speech that it felt didn’t fit neatly into the dichotomy spelled 
out in Pickering and Connick. Like Connick, the genesis of Garcetti was an 
employment dispute in an urban district attorney’s office.66 Richard Ceballos 
was a deputy assistant district attorney in Los Angeles County.67 As “calendar 
deputy,” Ceballos would review the work of other attorneys in the office at the 
request of defense attorneys.68 While acting on one such request, Ceballos 
agreed with the defense attorney that there were significant problems surround-
ing a state affidavit, problems that could adversely affect the prosecution of the 
case.69 As a result, he forwarded a recommendation that the case be dropped.70 
Ceballos’s recommendation was not well-received by his superiors, who not 
only proceeded with the prosecution, but also stripped him of his position as 
 
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. at 79. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. at 80. 
63  Id. at 81. 
64  Id. 
65  Id. 
66  Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 410 (2006). 
67  Id. at 413. 
68  Id. 
69  Id. at 413–14. 
70  Id. at 414. 
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calendar deputy, transferred him to another courthouse, and ultimately denied 
him a promotion.71 
Ceballos filed a suit in federal court, alleging that the actions were in retal-
iation for his exercise of his First Amendment speech rights.72 The Court disa-
greed, pointing out what it viewed as a critical difference between Ceballos’s 
case and the others it had decided.73 When Ceballos forwarded his recommen-
dation to his superiors, he was not speaking in his capacity as a private citizen 
on a matter of public concern like Pickering. He was speaking as an employee, 
but not on a matter of personal interest like Myers. Making such recommenda-
tions was officially part of his responsibilities as a calendar deputy. Therefore, 
he was speaking in the course of doing his job.74 
Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority: “We hold that when public em-
ployees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not 
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does 
not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”75 In the view of 
the Court, Ceballos was not a victim of illegal retaliation over the exercise of 
constitutionally protected speech. He was simply the recipient of consequences 
for poor performance—in this case, making recommendations that his supervi-
sors may have perceived as “inflammatory or misguided.”76 
In sum, the trilogy of Pickering, Connick, and Garcetti provide the frame-
work for all cases where public employees suffer ex post sanctions for engag-
ing in expressive activity. Under Connick, employee speech on matters of pri-
vate interest is left unprotected by the First Amendment. Under Garcetti, 
speech that is pursuant to job duties is unprotected by the First Amendment. 
Otherwise, employers must evaluate the disruptive impact or potential of em-
ployee speech under Pickering prior to imposing discipline. 
B. The Public-School Student’s Speech Rights 
A year after its seminal decision in Pickering, the Court once again turned 
to the issue of First Amendment speech rights in public schools, this time in 
the context of student speech. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District, the Court extended limited First Amendment speech rights to 
students.77 Fifteen-year-old John Tinker and his thirteen-year-old sister Mary 
Beth, along with sixteen-year-old Christopher Eckhardt, wore black armbands 
to school as a symbolic protest to American involvement in Vietnam.78 The 
students had planned to wear the armbands from December 16, 1965 through 
 
71  Id. at 414–15. 
72  Id. at 415. 
73  Id. at 421. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. at 423. 
77 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). 
78  Id. at 504. 
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the holiday season but, when Mary Beth arrived at school on the sixteenth, she 
was ordered to remove the armband.79 Though she complied with the adminis-
trator’s directive, she was still subsequently suspended.80 Eckhardt was also 
suspended the same day.81 John Tinker wore his armband the next day and was 
also suspended.82 
The Court determined that the students’ First Amendment rights had been 
violated, stating: “It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed 
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate.”83 While endorsing First Amendment protections for public school 
students, the Court also affirmed that school officials have “comprehensive au-
thority” to regulate student conduct within the schools.84 The problem, as the 
Court explained, was how to reconcile students’ First Amendment rights with 
the legitimate authority of the State to maintain order at school.85 
In the Court’s view, balancing these competing interests requires an evalu-
ation of the impact of particular speech upon the school environment. The stu-
dents’ expression in Tinker was a “silent, passive expression of opinion. . . .”86 
The armbands had not disrupted school business or interfered with the “rights 
of other students to be secure and to be let alone.”87 The Court opined that, 
when school authorities seek to sanction student expression, that decision must 
be based on “something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”88 Instead, 
school officials must show that the speech “materially disrupts classwork or 
involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. . . .”89 
Seventeen years after Tinker, the Court would weigh in on another student 
speech issue. In 1986, the Court decided Bethel v. Fraser, a case involving 
Mathew Fraser, a high school senior who was punished for giving a nominat-
ing speech at a school assembly that referred to a candidate using “an elabo-
rate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”90 Fraser’s speech contained no 
explicit profanity, but was filled with crude sexual references and double en-
tendre.91 Fraser shared the speech with two different teachers prior to the as-
 
79  Id. 
80  See The City Club of Cleveland, Mary Beth Tinker 11.9.2018, YOUTUBE (Nov. 12, 
2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fU8rZAiCk3w [https://perma.cc/S2FS-9TGH]. 
81  Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
82  Id. 
83  Id. at 506. 
84  Id. at 507. 
85  Id. 
86  Id. at 508. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. at 509. 
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91  Sample text of Fraser’s speech is as follows: 
I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his shirt, his character 
is firm . . . Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, 
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sembly, both of whom advised him against delivering it and warned that there 
could be “severe consequences” if he did.92 During the assembly, student reac-
tion to the speech ranged from confusion to embarrassment.93 Some students 
hooted, yelled, or mimicked the activities referenced in Fraser’s speech.94 
The following day, school authorities suspended Fraser under a school rule 
that prohibited “[c]onduct which materially and substantially interferes with 
the educational process” such as “the use of obscene, profane language or ges-
tures.”95 In addition to the suspension, Fraser was removed from a list of stu-
dent candidates to speak at the graduation ceremony at the end of the school 
year.96 
Fraser challenged the school’s action in federal court, alleging that both 
his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated.97 The district 
court sided with Fraser, holding that the school rule was unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad; Fraser was awarded damages, including an injunction 
against making him ineligible to speak at the graduation ceremony.98 The 
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that, under Tinker, 
the school had violated Fraser’s First Amendment speech rights by punishing 
him for non-disruptive speech.99 
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court found that Fraser’s speech dif-
fered significantly from the expression at issue in Tinker. An essential function 
of public education in America, the Court stated, is to “inculcate the habits and 
manners of civility as values in themselves . . . and as indispensable to the 
practice of self-government in the community and the nation.”100 The Court 
balanced the free speech rights of students against the state’s “countervailing 
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behav-
ior.”101 Fraser’s speech, while it may not have caused a substantial disruption, 
constituted an intrusion upon a basic educational mission.102 Ultimately, the 
Court concluded that it is not a violation of the First Amendment for a school 
to discipline students for engaging in speech that is vulgar or offensive, even if 
 
he’ll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t attack things in spurts—he 
drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally—he succeeds. 
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
92  Id. at 678. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. 
95  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
96  Id. 
97  Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 755 F.2d 1356, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985). 
98  Bethel, 478 U.S. at 679. 
99  Id. 
100  Id. at 681. 
101  Id. 
102  Id. at 685. 
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not legally obscene.103 Further, school administrators have broad discretion to 
define and determine what constitutes vulgar and offensive speech.104 
The decision in Fraser did not overturn Tinker, it simply created an “ex-
ception” to it, a particular type of speech (lewd or vulgar) that is not protected 
under the First Amendment. Two years after Fraser, the Supreme Court creat-
ed a second exception to the Tinker substantial disruption standard when it de-
cided yet another student speech case. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, which was de-
cided in 1988, involved a high school principal’s censorship of two articles that 
were set to appear in the student newspaper at Hazelwood East High School in 
St. Louis, Missouri.105 One of the articles was a feature about student experi-
ences with pregnancy, and the other dealt with the impact of divorce on stu-
dents.106 The principal worried that, though the article about pregnancy used 
pseudonyms, the school community would still be able to identify the girls 
who were profiled.107 With regard to the article about the impact of divorce, 
the principal was concerned that one of the students featured had been highly 
critical of her father, but student journalists had not given the father the chance 
to share his side of the story.108 
In determining that no First Amendment violation had occurred, the Court 
made an important distinction between the facts of the case and Tinker. In 
Tinker, the Court explained, it had answered the question of whether the First 
Amendment required schools to “tolerate particular student speech.”109 In Ha-
zelwood, however, the question was whether the First Amendment required 
schools “affirmatively to promote particular student speech.”110 The difference 
was significant because the question in Hazelwood required the Court to con-
sider the authority of the state as educator to exert control over “school-
sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities 
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to 
bear the imprimatur of the school.”111 Thus, the Court crafted a distinct catego-
 
103  Id. at 685–86. Courts have never protected student speech or writing that is legally ob-
scene. However, educators must remember that language is not legally obscene merely be-
cause it contains offensive, vulgar, or “dirty” words. To be legally obscene, material must 
violate three tests developed by the Supreme Court: (1) it must appeal to the prurient or lust-
ful interest; (2) it must describe sexual conduct in a way that is “patently offensive” to 
community standards; and (3) “taken as a whole, [it] lacks serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value.” Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
104  For more on Bethel, see David Schimmel, Lewd Language Not Protected: Bethel School 
District v. Fraser, 33 EDUC. L. REP. 999, 999–1005 (1986); Elizabeth A. Shaver, Denying 
Certiorari in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board: A Missed Opportunity to Clarify Stu-
dents’ First Amendment Rights in the Digital Age, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1539, 1545–47 
(2017). 
105  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 264 (1988). 
106  Id. at 263. 
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108  Id. 
109  Id. at 270. 
110  Id. at 270–71. 
111  Id. at 271. 
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ry of student speech that might be subject to discipline, specifically student 
speech that is school-sponsored. The Court stated: “[E]ducators do not offend 
the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over . . . student speech in 
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”112 
The Court’s last student speech case was decided in 2007. In January of 
2002, the Olympic Torch passed through Juneau, Alaska, on its way to Salt 
Lake City, Utah, where the Winter Olympic Games were held that year.113 At 
Douglas High School in Juneau, Principal Debra Morse allowed the students 
and staff to exit the building in order to watch the Olympic Torch Parade as it 
passed by the school.114 Joseph Frederick arrived at the school late that day and 
joined a group of students who were standing across the street from the school 
to witness the parade.115 As the Olympic Torch passed, Frederick and his 
friends held up a large banner that read: “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”116 Principal 
Morse approached the group and directed them to take down the banner.117 
Everyone, with the exception of Frederick, complied.118 Frederick was sus-
pended for ten school days pursuant to a school policy that forbade student ex-
pression that could be construed to advocate “the use of substances that are il-
legal to minors.”119 
Frederick appealed to the superintendent of the district, who agreed that 
the message on the banner seemed to advocate the use of marijuana and, as a 
result, disrupted the school’s mission to educate students “about the dangers of 
illegal drugs.”120 Frederick filed suit in federal district court, claiming a viola-
tion of his First Amendment rights.121 The district court granted summary 
judgment for the district, but the Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that the banner 
was not sufficiently disruptive under Tinker to justify disciplinary action by the 
school.122 
The Supreme Court reversed. “Congress has declared that part of a 
school’s job is educating students about the dangers of illegal drug use,” the 
 
112  Id. at 273. Concerns over abuses of the broad discretion to censor granted to school ad-
ministrators by the Hazelwood holding have prompted at least fourteen states to pass stat-
utes protecting student journalists from the type of censorship endorsed by the Court in Ha-
zelwood. See Who New Voices Protects, STUDENT PRESS L. CTR., http://splc.org/the-
legislation/ [https://perma.cc/E3A7-W7DR] (last visited Nov. 19, 2019) (providing access to 
the state statutes). 
113  Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
114  Id. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. 
117  Id. at 398. 
118  Id. 
119  Id. 
120  Id. at 398–99. 
121  Id. at 399 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
122  Id. 
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Court declared.123 “Student speech celebrating illegal drug use at a school 
event, in the presence of school administrators and teachers,” the Court contin-
ued, “poses a particular challenge for school officials working to protect those 
entrusted to their care from the dangers of drug abuse.”124 Nothing in the First 
Amendment, the Court reasoned, requires schools to tolerate student speech at 
a school event that would heighten those dangers.125 Thus, another exception to 
the Tinker substantial disruption test was created: schools may sanction student 
speech that can reasonably be interpreted to promote illegal drug use, whether 
or not that speech is disruptive. 
Of all of the Supreme Court’s student speech cases, Morse is the only one 
that even touched on the scope of school authority over student speech that 
takes place off campus. The Court rejected an argument from the student that 
his speech was not “school speech” simply because he physically had not been 
on school grounds. The Court found that the student, who was “stand[ing] in 
the midst of his fellow students, during school hours” was under the authority 
of school officials at the time that the banner was unfurled.126 While the Court 
did acknowledge an “outer boundar[y]” regarding the scope of school authori-
ty, it found that this outer boundary had not been reached on the facts of the 
case.127 
II. PUBLIC EDUCATOR SPEECH: EMERGING ISSUES AND TOPICS 
Even before the explosion of social media and resultant litigation, lower 
federal courts struggled to apply Supreme Court precedent to cases involving 
public-employee speech. This has resulted in a significant split between the 
circuit courts, which are divided on exactly how to discern when an employee 
is speaking on a matter of private interest or as a citizen on a matter of public 
concern. Most specifically, the disagreement revolves around which of the 
Connick variables is most important: content, form, or context. This results in a 
significant disparity in the breadth of public employee speech rights based up-
on the circuit. 
Some circuits, including the Fourth, Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh, have prior-
itized the form and context of speech. These “contextual circuits” place greater 
weight “on both the capacity and the motivation of the speaker.”128 Public edu-
cators who live in contextual circuits may legally be subjected to adverse em-
ployment action even when their speech touches on a matter of inherent public 
concern and is non-disruptive.129 Content-based circuits, which include the 
First, Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth, largely eschew contextual fac-
 
123  Id. at 408. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. at 410. 
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128  Black, supra note 4, at 62. 
129  Id. at 62–63. 
16 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL[Vol. 20:Error! Reference source not found. 
tors such as speaker capacity or motivation when the content of the speech 
touches on an inherent public concern, such as politics or public corruption.130 
Two cases, one from the Eleventh Circuit and one from the Sixth Circuit, illus-
trate how these two different approaches can impact outcomes. 
In 1996, the Eleventh Circuit ruled against a public educator who criti-
cized his school’s registration, scheduling, and teacher assignment process-
es.131 Social Studies teacher Lawrence Ferrara spoke out in a faculty meeting 
and later in a private meeting with his principal.132 To his dismay, he was sub-
sequently assigned to teach all freshman and sophomore courses.133 Though 
the topics about which Ferrara had complained might have been inherently of 
concern to members of the public, the court viewed his motivation for speaking 
as purely personal.134 The court held that “a public employee may not trans-
form a personal grievance into a matter of public concern by invoking a sup-
posed popular interest in the way public institutions are run.”135 Because the 
court viewed Ferrara as a disgruntled employee, his speech failed the Connick 
test of public concern and was not protected.136 
The Sixth Circuit reached a completely different conclusion in the case of 
Netta Banks, a substitute teacher in Wolfe County, Kentucky who was reas-
signed after she had filed formal complaints with the state alleging irregulari-
ties in the interview and hiring process at her school.137 The complaints came 
after a five-year period during which she repeatedly interviewed for full-time 
teaching positions but was never offered a job as a certified teacher.138 Upon 
reviewing the record, the Sixth Circuit found evidence in Banks’s testimony to 
suggest personal motivation for her complaints—namely her personal griev-
ance in having been passed over for employment.139 While the court acknowl-
edged that Banks’s complaints were predominately private, the finding that 
some of them touched on matters of public concern was enough to prompt the 
court to remand the case to the district court so that Banks’s speech could re-
ceive a proper balancing under Pickering.140 
Two additional circuit cases from outside the educational arena, both in-
volving complaints about sexual harassment, provide an even more stark illus-
tration of how this split results in a disparity in the breadth of speech rights for 
educators and other public employees. The first, in 1994, involved an employ-
ee in the Department of Development of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania who 
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complained that she had been sexually harassed by an executive assistant to the 
county commissioner.141 Taking a content-based approach, the Third Circuit 
focused directly upon the nature of the speech, which concerned an “incident 
of sexual harassment” allegedly perpetrated by someone “exercising authority 
in the name of a public official. . . .”142 Such discriminatory behavior on the 
part of a public official was an issue that inherently rose to the level of public 
concern, the court ruled.143 Though the complaint involved only the employ-
ee’s personal grievance related to sexual harassment, the court could find noth-
ing in its analysis of the form and context of her complaints that would dimin-
ish the value of these communications “to the process of self-governance.”144 
As such, the speech was protected, irrespective of contextual concerns such as 
motivation or speaker capacity. 
In contrast, two years later the Tenth Circuit held that a female officer’s 
complaint of sexual harassment against male officers did not touch on a matter 
of public concern and, therefore, was unprotected speech.145 Taking a contex-
tual approach, the Tenth Circuit focused on the capacity in which the employee 
spoke, even referring to it as the “fundamental inquiry” in its analysis.146 The 
court evaluated the employee’s motivation to determine whether the speech 
was “calculated to redress personal grievances [and therefore spoken as an em-
ployee] or to address a broader public purpose [and therefore spoken as a citi-
zen].”147 Because the officer in question alleged that she had been “personally 
subjected to sexual harassment, retaliation, and unwarranted disciplinary ac-
tion” the court found that her speech dealt only with the “conditions of her own 
employment,” indicating that she was speaking in the role of an employee, not 
as a citizen.148 Her complaints of sexual harassment, therefore, were left unpro-
tected. 
Clearly, public employees who live in contextual circuits are far more at 
risk of losing First Amendment protection in free speech cases. With the recent 
explosion of litigation involving the online expression of public employees, 
this split could become increasingly problematic. This is a major schism in cir-
cuit approaches that merits the attention of the Supreme Court. The way in 
which the Court chooses to resolve this split will substantially alter the analysis 
in public-employee speech cases over a large swath of the country. Despite the 
existence of this interpretive split between circuits, analysis of cases involving 
public employees and online speech does seem to reveal some larger trends, 
which are discussed below. 
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A. Connick is Rarely Decisive in Cases Involving Public Employees’ Online 
Speech 
After the launch of Facebook in 2004, as social media use became more 
and more widespread among adults, it didn’t take long for problems to present 
themselves for public educators. The earliest disputes involving educators and 
social media found their way into federal district courts in 2008, and the educa-
tors lost both cases.149 The United States District Court of Connecticut upheld 
the dismissal of a high school English teacher who communicated with stu-
dents via MySpace during non-school hours.150 Jeffery Spanierman used his 
page to discuss both school-related and personal matters with his students.151 
The court used the Connick public concern test to strip Spanierman of his First 
Amendment protection, noting that not much of the content on his page 
seemed to rise to the level of a matter of public interest.152 
Later that same year, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania ruled against a student teacher at Conestoga Valley High 
School who posted critical comments about her supervising teacher, as well as 
a photo of herself hoisting a plastic cup and wearing a pirate hat.153 The photo 
was accompanied by the caption “drunken pirate.”154 Stacy Snyder was in the 
process of completing requirements for a bachelor’s degree and teaching cre-
dentials at Millersville University, but the picture, along with her criticism of 
her supervising teacher, got her removed from her student teaching position.155 
As a result, she was unable to complete her education degree or receive teach-
ing credentials.156 Even though Snyder was a student and not an official em-
ployee of the district, a district judge applied the Connick test of public con-
cern, and held that Snyder’s speech was that of an employee on a matter of 
private interest, and was therefore not protected by the First Amendment.157 
These two early cases fueled speculation that the Connick test of public 
concern might, for all intents and purposes, strip First Amendment protection 
from public educators who engage on social media. In 2010, Patricia Nidiffer 
from the University of Dayton warned that any social media expression by a 
public educator that does not touch on a matter of public concern is likely to be 
 
149  See Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 297 (D. Conn. 2008); Snyder v. Mil-
lersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008). 
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job-threatening if it finds the wrong audience.158 In 2012, Mary Rose Papan-
drea of the Boston College Law School also expressed concerns that judicial 
reliance on Connick in social media cases would severely undermine the con-
stitutional rights of public educators.159 These concerns seemed well-founded 
in 2012, but as more and more cases have been decided, it appears that the 
Connick public concern test is not as substantial a risk to educators’ online 
speech rights as these scholars once thought.160 
Of thirty-three federal cases reviewed since 2008, only nine (27 percent) 
have relied on the Connick test of public concern to disqualify the online 
speech of a public employee from First Amendment protection.161 The trend 
toward bypassing Connick in favor of balancing under Pickering holds at both 
the district and circuit court levels. Connick has proven decisive in only five of 
eighteen (27 percent) district-level cases, with a nineteenth case featuring three 
employees who passed Connick and one who did not. Employees failed to pass 
the Connick test of public concern in four of fourteen (28 percent) of the circuit 
level cases reviewed.162 
This trend exists even in cases where employees engage in speech that ar-
guably touches more on private than public concerns. The Ninth Circuit, in the 
2009 case of Richerson v. Beckon, “assume[d], without deciding” that a teach-
er’s “highly personal and vituperative” blog posts about her employers and co-
workers touched on matters of public concern.163 In 2013, the Seventh Circuit 
held that a high school guidance counselor who had self-published a relation-
ship book for women which was filled with misogynistic and racially offensive 
language was speaking as a citizen on the dynamics of adult relationships, a 
subject matter that it considered a public concern.164 In 2015, the Third Circuit 
“reluctantly assume[d]” that a teacher was blogging on matters of public con-
cern when she wrote about commentary she’d like to add to student’s report 
cards, such as “[f]rightfully dim,” “[l]azy asshole,” and “[u]tterly loathsome in 
all imaginable ways.”165 The court believed that she was, in her own way, ad-
dressing the work ethic of today’s youth and the value of hard work in general, 
a matter of public concern.166 
In 2016, the Fourth Circuit decided Liverman v. City of Petersburg, which 
involved two police officers discussing police promotion policies on Face-
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163  Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App’x 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2009). 
164  Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist., 736 F.3d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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book.167 One officer argued that promoting officers into leadership when they 
had insufficient background or experience negatively impacted officer safety, 
and the officer cited statistics to support his points.168 The second officer 
agreed with the first officer’s points, but then made a thinly veiled reference to 
an individual within the department whom he believed had been wrongly pro-
moted.169 The district court analyzed the two officers’ speech separately and 
found that the first officer’s speech passed the Connick test of public concern, 
while the second officer’s didn’t.170 The Fourth Circuit, however, considered 
the two officers’ speech as a “single expression of speech to be considered in 
its entirety,” and held that both employees passed the test of public concern.171 
While one officer had used a “more colloquial tone,” both were generally voic-
ing concerns about the department’s ability to effectively carry out its mis-
sion.172 
In 2017, the Fourth Circuit decided Grutzmacher v. Howard County, a 
case with a similar set of facts. Members of a fire department were discussing 
gun control online and making derogatory comments towards political liber-
als.173 Some of their online commentary was racially offensive.174 The court 
opined that much, but not all, of the content discussed by the firemen touched 
on matters of public concern.175 Again, the Fourth Circuit held that the multi-
ple interactions and comments on Facebook should be treated as one single ex-
pression, one that focused on a matter of public concern.176 
Decreased judicial reliance on Connick in favor of Pickering in First 
Amendment cases involving public employees and social media or other elec-
tronic speech is not entirely surprising, considering that many social media us-
ers routinely use their accounts to discuss politics or other current events. As 
such, it makes sense that the content of public-employee expression will also 
frequently touch on matters of inherent public concern. In a significant number 
of the cases reviewed, this was exactly the case. For example, in the 2013 
Fourth Circuit decision Bland v. Roberts, the court held that deputy sheriffs 
who had been fired after “liking” and making supportive comments on the Fa-
cebook page of the man running for sheriff were speaking as citizens on a mat-
ter of public concern—local politics.177 In Duke v. Hamil, a deputy police chief 
in Georgia was demoted after posting a Confederate flag and a call for a sec-
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ond revolution in response to President Obama’s reelection.178 The political 
nature of his postings ensured that his speech easily passed the Connick test of 
public concern.179 Cases such as these serve to remind us that the content of 
public employees’ social media expression is just like that of the public in gen-
eral—often meant to be seen by a reasonably limited audience, but frequently 
touching on matters of inherent public concern. 
Even in cases in which employee speech does not seem on its face to be 
inherently of public concern, judges have bypassed Connick. This was the case 
in both Richerson and Munroe, where teachers blogged highly demeaning per-
sonal thoughts about co-workers and students.180 The Connick framework is 
simply problematic in analyzing the type of speech presented in many of these 
cases. Online speech often doesn’t fit neatly into the dichotomous categories of 
either citizen speech on a matter of public concern or employee speech on a 
matter of private interest. In many cases, an employee’s online speech repre-
sents a hybrid of the two types of speech identified in Connick—the speech of 
a private citizen on a matter of personal interest. 
A notable exception, however, is the Fifth Circuit—which has ruled 
against public employees who were speaking as citizens on matters of private 
interest three times between 2015 and 2018. The case Graziosi v. the City of 
Greenville, Mississippi dealt with Sergeant Susan Graziosi of the Greenville, 
Mississippi police department, who lost her job after posting comments on Fa-
cebook that were critical of the Greenville police chief.181 Graziosi was upset 
that the chief had not sent a departmental representative to the nearby commu-
nity of Pearl, Mississippi for the funeral of an officer from that department 
who had been killed in the line of duty.182 Her initial post was on her personal 
Facebook page and included a plea to the city’s mayor to “please get a leader” 
who understood the importance of sending representatives to neighboring 
communities when police officers are lost.183 Later, she reposted her comments 
on the mayor’s public Facebook page, adding the rejoinder “[i]f you don’t 
want to lead, can you just get the hell out of the way.”184 The district court had 
ruled that she was speaking in the capacity of an employee, because she’d cited 
her membership in the department and used the first person plural “we” to 
show membership in that group.185 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that 
she was speaking not as an employee, but as a citizen.186 But while the Fifth 
Circuit conceded that Graziosi’s speech held inherent public concern, it found 
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that her posts “quickly devolved into a rant” against the chief’s leadership, 
fueled by previous conflict between her and the chief.187 Thus, the Fifth Circuit 
combined the Connick speech variables in a novel way to create a form of un-
protected speech not previously contemplated by the Court in Connick: that of 
a citizen on a matter of private concern.188 
In the 2017 case Lumpkin v. Aransas County, the Fifth Circuit ruled 
against two paralegals who were fired because of a series of private text mes-
sages in which they were critical of the Aransas County Attorney Richard 
Bianchi.189 According to the court, the messages touched on the impact of 
Bianchi’s campaign on the office, office and personal affairs, and opinions 
about Bianchi’s intelligence and competence.190 The texts were between the 
two paralegals and former Assistant Aransas County Attorney Deborah Bauer, 
who had previously been fired by Bianchi.191 The messages only came to the 
attention of the county because Bauer produced them as part of her legal chal-
lenge to her termination, which she also alleged was in retaliation for criticiz-
ing Bianchi.192 The Fifth Circuit held that the paralegals’ text messages were 
clearly the expression of private citizens, but the expression still didn’t meet 
the test of “public concern.”193 The court, therefore, disqualified the texts from 
First Amendment protection, once again holding that when public employees 
speak as private citizens on a matter of private interest, their speech is not pro-
tected.194 
In the 2018 case Malin v. Orleans Parish Communication District, the 
Fifth Circuit held for a third time that a public employee’s speech as a private 
citizen on a matter of private concern is not protected.195 This case involved 
Frith Malin, a deputy director of the Orleans Parish Communication District 
(OPCD) who responded to an email from her supervisor, the executive direc-
tor, announcing to the organization that one of OPCD‘s board members had 
been named CEO of another organization and would be leaving the board.196 
Malin emailed back, suggesting that this particular board member would do a 
good job of “bleeding all these funds dry, just as he has done with the City.”197 
Unfortunately, she hit the “reply all” button, sending her email to the entire or-
ganization. As a result, she was suspended and ultimately terminated.198 The 
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Fifth Circuit ruled that the employee was speaking, at least in part, as a citizen, 
but that the content of her email did not constitute a public concern.199 
These recent decisions from the Fifth Circuit seem to increase the chances 
of Supreme Court intervention at some point. And if other circuits follow the 
Fifth Circuit’s lead and use Connick to strip First Amendment protection from 
employees who are speaking as citizens on matters of private interest, Connick 
could become a greater threat to educators’ online expression than it appears to 
be currently. Until the Supreme Court clarifies where this type of speech fits 
into the Connick equation, however, school administrators would be wise to 
avoid taking negative employment action against educators because of online 
speech, unless they have evidence to support some sort of disruptive impact on 
institutional efficacy.200 Relying on a broad reading of the Connick test of pub-
lic concern places employers at increased risk legally. 
B. Online Employee Expression is Rarely Pursuant to Job Duties 
In cases involving the online speech of public employees, the “pursuant to 
job duties” test emanating from Garcetti v. Ceballos has rarely been determi-
native. There are only three cyber-speech cases in which a court has relied on 
Garcetti in order to disqualify an employee from First Amendment protec-
tion.201 The most instructive of these was decided in October of 2014 by the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. The 
court ruled that Courtney Austin, the director of the Preston County Animal 
Shelter, was speaking pursuant to her job duties when she created and adminis-
tered a shelter Facebook page.202 “An employee may still be acting ‘pursuant 
to official duties,’ ” the court stated, “even if she engages in speech that is not 
part of her official job duties so long as it is in furtherance of such job du-
ties.”203 Although Austin was not directed to establish and maintain the shelter 
Facebook page, she did not use the page for personal communication, only for 
shelter business.204 Austin’s posts showed as “Preston County Animal Shelter” 
rather than her own name.205 The shelter’s Facebook page was listed in shelter 
information as its official website.206 All this, in the view of the court, led to 
the conclusion that she was speaking in the capacity of an employee “pursuant 
to her job duties,” and as such, had no claim under the First Amendment.207 
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The Preston County case would seem to suggest that educators who use 
social media to communicate with students might be speaking “pursuant to job 
duties.” But this stands in contrast to Spanierman v. Hughes, discussed supra, 
which involved a high school English teacher who used the social networking 
site MySpace to communicate with students.208 The district court considered 
whether the online communications with students had occurred in his role “as a 
public employee pursuant to his official duties.”209 Despite the fact that much 
of the content on the page was school-related, the court did not view the online 
communication as “pursuant” to his job duties, largely because there was no 
evidence that he was directed by his employer to communicate with his stu-
dents on MySpace.210 
Spanierman notwithstanding, the Preston County case is cautionary for 
any public educator who administers social media pages on behalf of a school 
organization. A fine arts director, for example, who maintains a Twitter, Insta-
gram, or Facebook page for a school program such as band, orchestra, or choir 
should be aware that such communication could be considered pursuant to job 
duties even if he or she was not specifically directed to maintain such a page. 
Administrators who expect their employees to maintain an official web pres-
ence should ensure their employees know that their online expression is in fur-
therance of their job duties and is not protected speech. 
Although the Preston County Animal Shelter case stands as the only feder-
al case reviewed in which the social media expression of a public employee 
was held to be pursuant to job duties, it should be mentioned that there are oth-
er forms of digital communication embraced in the modern workplace that may 
be more susceptible to disqualification under Garcetti. Emails and texts are 
much less likely to reach an unintended audience than social media postings 
but can frequently go public as a result of litigation or open records requests. 
When this happens, these forms of communication seem more likely than so-
cial media postings to be considered pursuant to job duties. Recently, the Tenth 
Circuit ruled that a city planner was speaking pursuant to his job duties when 
he sent an email to the city attorney raising concerns about suspected corrup-
tion directly related to a city project with which he was involved.211 Addition-
ally, a federal district court in New York ruled that a teacher who sent a series 
of internal emails expressing concerns about student discipline, conduct of dis-
trict employees, district policies, lack of support, and alleged violations of 
law/policy was speaking pursuant to her job duties.212 Cases such as these sug-
gest that public educators should be exceedingly cautious about emails and 
other text messages that pertain to work. Even when educators use private 
emails or cell phones to communicate, if they are communicating with col-
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leagues or superiors about work-related issues, these communications may be 
considered pursuant to job duties and therefore unprotected by the First 
Amendment. 
A trend that could make Garcetti more relevant in the future is the increas-
ing embrace of social media by school systems interested in facilitating com-
munication with stakeholders. Consider that when Frederick County Public 
Schools in Maryland hired Katie Nash as their “Social Media Coordinator” in 
November of 2016, they were looking to her to build more community en-
gagement.213 “We had received feedback from some students in a focus group 
that our tweeting was a bit flat,” Nash explained.214 In January of 2017, with 
winter weather approaching, a student tweeted a request to the district: 
“[C]lose school tammarow [sic] PLEASE.”215 From the district’s Twitter page, 
Nash responded, “but then how would you learn to spell ‘tomorrow’?”216 Nash 
was fired a week later.217 
The district was widely criticized for its actions. Nash became a celebrity 
on Twitter, but she didn’t challenge her firing.218 Even if she had, however, it’s 
hard to see how her speech would not have qualified as “pursuant to job du-
ties” under Garcetti, thus making it unprotected by the First Amendment. She 
was, after all, the social media director for the district. Managing the district’s 
social media presence was her job. As more school districts are considering 
hiring social media managers in an effort increase their digital engagement, it 
is possible that the Garcetti standard may come into play in more cases in the 
future. 
C. The Pickering Balancing Test is Frequently Decisive in Cases Involving 
Public Employee Speech 
Because Connick and Garcetti both seem to be of limited utility in cases 
involving public employees and social media or other internet-based speech, 
Pickering has emerged as the most relevant tool for analyzing online employee 
speech. The concept of disruption articulated by Pickering is expansive enough 
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to allow employers broad leeway to discipline employees who engage in con-
troversial speech online, as long as they can document some level of disruption 
to the efficacy of the institution or individual employee. Pickering has proved 
determinative in two-thirds (20/30) of the reviewed cases.219 In total, the Pick-
ering test has tilted toward the employers in eleven of the cases in which it was 
decisive, and toward the employees in nine.220 Until recently, it appeared that 
the Pickering test was tilted significantly in favor of the employer. Through 
2015, employees survived balancing under Pickering only twice.221 Only when 
employers failed to present sufficient evidence of workplace disruptions did 
employees prevail.222 In cases decided 2016 or later, however, there are seven 
more examples of the test tilting towards employees.223 
The Pickering Test in online speech cases often comes down to whether 
the speech interferes with an employee’s ability to continue to function effec-
tively in the workplace. For example, when Natalie Munroe blogged commen-
tary that she wished to add to students’ report cards, the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that, by directing such “invective” at the very people she was 
supposed to serve, she had rendered herself unable to effectively continue in 
the job.224 In Craig v. Rich Township High School District, the Seventh Circuit 
upheld the firing of a high school guidance counselor and girls’ basketball 
coach after he self-published a relationship book for women that was full of 
misogynistic and racist stereotypes.225 Due to the nature of the book’s content, 
members of the community rightfully lost confidence in the teacher’s fitness to 
counsel or coach their children. 
III. STUDENT OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH: CONFUSION AND DIVISION 
Before the explosive growth of digital communications, several federal 
circuit courts had affirmed that school officials have no authority over student 
speech that takes place outside of school and does not disrupt the school envi-
ronment.226 With the tremendous rise of digital communications—and the var-
ying forms that such communications can take (text, tweet, Instagram photo, 
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“liking” material on social media platforms)—the courts have struggled to find 
the proper balance between students’ First Amendment rights when not at 
school and the authority of school officials to discipline students for off-
campus speech that affects the school environment. As a result, student-speech 
cases decided by the lower federal courts in the last fifteen years or so have 
brought about a confusing patchwork of varying standards and rulings on the 
important question of whether school officials have authority to discipline stu-
dents for speech that is created and distributed outside of school. 
One of the early cases regarding student off-campus speech was a 2004 
decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Porter v. Ascension Parish 
School Board.227 In Porter, the Fifth Circuit held that a student’s violent draw-
ing of a school shooting, which came to the attention of school officials two 
years after its creation because the student’s younger brother had discovered 
the picture at home and taken it to school, was not school speech that was sub-
ject to school authority.228 
In determining that school officials had violated the student’s First 
Amendment rights for disciplining him for a picture he had created and stored 
outside of school, the Fifth Circuit noted that the student had not “publicized 
[the drawing] in a way certain to result in its appearance at” school, thus re-
moving it from the protection of the First Amendment.229 Indeed, the Fifth Cir-
cuit stated that “[p]rivate writings made and kept in one’s home enjoy the pro-
tection of the First Amendment . . . .”230 The court, while recognizing that the 
distinction between “on-campus” and “off-campus” speech may sometimes be 
unclear, posited that a student’s speech is subject to school authority only 
where it has been composed on campus or “purposefully brought” to school.231 
And when the Supreme Court decided Morse just a few years later, it cited the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Porter for the proposition that an “outer boundar[y]” 
exists, beyond which school officials may not regulate student speech.232 
Very soon after the decisions in Porter and Morse, the issue regarding stu-
dents’ First Amendment rights shifted dramatically from homemade banners 
and hand-sketched drawings to electronically created speech. In the electronic 
speech era, the federal courts have been unable to establish clear or consistent 
standards to address the scope of school authority over students’ off-campus 
speech. Rather, the federal courts have either declined to address the issue233 or 
crafted various tests234 in an attempt to balance students’ speech rights with the 
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need for school officials to maintain a safe and orderly school environment. 
While the courts have developed different analytical frameworks, the courts 
largely do require that school officials satisfy some “threshold test” in order to 
be able to assume authority over students’ off-campus electronic speech.235 
And yet, with each successive decision of a federal appellate court, the scope 
and requirements of these threshold tests have shifted greatly. Thus, the lower 
federal courts—and school administrators—have little guidance when review-
ing cases involving student off-campus, electronic speech. 
A. Shifting Sands: The Federal Appellate Courts Create, Modify, and 
Redefine the Scope of School Authority Over Students’ Off-Campus Speech 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals was the first federal appellate court 
to weigh in on the issue of school authority over a student’s off-campus elec-
tronic speech.236 In two decisions that were issued within a year after the deci-
sion in Morse, the Second Circuit determined that school officials have the au-
thority to discipline students for off-campus electronic speech if it is 
“reasonably foreseeable that the [speech] would come to the attention of school 
authorities”237 or otherwise “reach campus.”238 
In both cases, the Second Circuit found the student’s manner of distrib-
uting the speech to be important in determining whether school officials could 
assert authority over the off-campus speech. For example, in a case where a 
student had created an instant message (IM) icon that depicted the shooting of 
a teacher, the Second Circuit noted the “extensive distribution” of the icon, in-
cluding both the number of individuals to whom the icon had been sent and the 
amount of time that it remained available to be viewed.239 In the second case, 
the Second Circuit noted that the student’s blog posting had been publicly ac-
cessible and that the student had “purposely designed” the blog posting to be 
seen by the school community.240 Those actions by each of the two students 
had made it “reasonably foreseeable” that the students’ speech would reach 
school.241 
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The Second Circuit’s reasonable foreseeability test was quickly adopted 
and applied by both the Fourth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeal.242 In a 
case involving a student’s off-campus speech that had threatened a school 
shooting, the Eighth Circuit relied on Second Circuit precedent in holding that 
school officials had properly disciplined the student because it had been rea-
sonably foreseeable that the student’s speech would “come to the attention of 
the school authorities.”243 A year later, the Eighth Circuit again applied the 
Second Circuit’s reasonable foreseeability test when it held that school offi-
cials could discipline students for off-campus racist speech because the speech 
had been “reasonably [] expected to reach the school or impact the environ-
ment.”244 
As the Second Circuit had done, the Eighth Circuit also noted the form of 
distribution of the off-campus speech as relevant on the scope of authority is-
sue. In one case, the student had communicated his thoughts about a school 
shooting to several students via an instant messaging service.245 In the second 
case, the students’ racist blog postings had appeared on a publicly accessible 
website that was not password protected and, within only a few days after the 
blog postings began, the majority of the student body had become aware of the 
postings.246 
The Fourth Circuit also has applied the Second Circuit’s “reasonable fore-
seeability” test, although the decision also contained language that has been 
interpreted to have created a “nexus” test. In 2011, the Fourth Circuit decided 
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, a case filed by a high school student 
who had created a discussion group webpage that bullied a classmate by alleg-
ing that the classmate had contracted herpes.247 In determining that school offi-
cials had properly disciplined the student for her off-campus speech, the Fourth 
Circuit applied the Second Circuit’s reasonable foreseeability test.248 Specifi-
cally, the Fourth Circuit determined that discipline is appropriate when “it [is] 
. . . foreseeable that the off-campus expression might . . . reach campus.”249 On 
the facts of the case, the court determined that “it was foreseeable in this case 
that [the student’s] conduct would reach the school . . . .”250 And, similar to the 
Second Circuit cases discussed above, the Fourth Circuit noted that the student 
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had encouraged widespread distribution of her speech, inviting approximately 
100 people to join the discussion group webpage.251 
The Kowalski decision also contained language that has been interpreted 
as having created a “nexus” test to resolve the scope of authority issue.252 Spe-
cifically, the Fourth Circuit stated: 
There is surely a limit to the scope of a high school’s interest in the order, safe-
ty, and well-being of its students when the speech at issue originates outside the 
schoolhouse gate. But we need not fully define that limit here, as we are satis-
fied that the nexus of [the student’s] speech to [the] [h]igh [s]chool’s pedagogi-
cal interests was sufficiently strong to justify the action taken by school officials 
in carrying out their role as the trustees of the student body’s well-being.253 
The reference to a “nexus” in this passage caused some courts and com-
mentators to opine that the Fourth Circuit had created a nexus test, although 
the decision did not provide any details about the parameters of such a nexus 
test.254 Although, it seems unlikely that the Fourth Circuit chose to create a 
second test even as it applied the Second Circuit’s reasonable foreseeability 
test,255 the decision continues to be cited as having created a nexus test.256 In-
deed, as discussed in further detail below, later federal decisions have begun to 
combine and conflate the reasonable foreseeability and nexus tests into one.257 
In 2015, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, rather than adopting either the 
reasonable foreseeability or the nexus tests, created its own threshold test re-
garding the scope-of-school-authority issue.258 The case involved a rap song 
recorded outside of school and posted on the Internet that contained vulgar 
language and accused two school employees of sexually harassing female stu-
dents.259 In August 2015, an en banc panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dis-
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trict court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the school board.260 While 
declining “to adopt any rigid standard”261 with regard to the scope of authority 
issue, the Fifth Circuit created a test that essentially only applied to the highly 
specific facts before it. The majority held that school officials may discipline a 
student for off-campus speech if (a) “a student intentionally directs [speech] at 
the school community,” and (b) the speech is “reasonably understood by 
school officials to threaten, harass, and intimidate a teacher.”262 
The Third Circuit has avoided the scope of authority issue altogether, hav-
ing decided two student off-campus electronic speech cases on other 
grounds.263 The two cases both involved students who had been disciplined for 
creating fake—and unflattering—social media profiles of school administra-
tors. In the first case, the Third Circuit avoided the scope of authority issue be-
cause the school district alleged only that discipline was appropriate under 
Fraser on the ground that the student’s speech had been lewd and obscene.264 
School officials argued that, by using the district’s website to copy a photo-
graph of the school administrator, the student had “entered” school, thus giving 
school officials the authority to impose discipline.265 The Third Circuit rejected 
that argument and held that Fraser applies only to lewd or obscene speech ut-
tered at school, not to speech that appears on the Internet.266 In the second case, 
the Third Circuit found in favor of the student on the ground that, even assum-
ing that authority existed over the student’s off-campus speech, the school dis-
trict had failed to satisfy Tinker’s substantial disruption test.267 
The most recent decisions regarding the scope of school authority over 
student off-campus speech have been issued by the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.268 In 2013, the Ninth Circuit decided Wynar v. Douglas County School 
District, a case in which a student had been disciplined for off-campus speech 
that threatened a school shooting.269 The Ninth Circuit held that school offi-
cials had authority to discipline a student who, from his home, had sent “a 
string of increasingly violent and threatening instant messages . . . bragging 
about his weapons, threatening to shoot specific classmates, intimating that he 
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269  Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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would ‘take out’ other people at a school shooting on a specific date, and in-
voking the image of the Virginia Tech massacre.”270 
In addressing the scope of authority issue, the Ninth Circuit reviewed all of 
the then-issued decisions of its “sister circuits,”271 primarily the decisions of 
the Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits.272 The Ninth Circuit noted that these 
circuit courts had devised “additional threshold test[s]”273 as prerequisites to 
the application of Tinker’s substantial disruption standard. The Ninth Circuit 
identified both a nexus test, citing the Fourth Circuit,274 and a reasonable fore-
seeability test, citing the Second and Eighth Circuits.275 
Yet the Ninth Circuit declined to adopt any of these tests. The court noted 
the difficulty of articulating “a global standard for a myriad of circumstances 
involving off-campus speech.”276 It also expressed “reluctan[ce] to . . . craft a 
one-size fits all approach.”277 Rather, the court relied on the content of the stu-
dent’s speech, stating that “when faced with an identifiable threat of school vi-
olence, schools may take disciplinary action in response to off-campus speech” 
that would cause a substantial disruption.278 
In 2016, the Ninth Circuit returned to the scope of authority issue. In C.R. 
v. Eugene School District 4J, the Ninth Circuit held that school officials had 
the authority to discipline middle school students who had directed sexually 
suggestive speech to other students on property that was adjacent to school 
grounds.279 The speech in question had taken place while the students were 
walking home from school and, thus, was not electronic off-campus speech.280 
As it had in Wynar, the Ninth Circuit found that there were two primary 
tests to address the scope of authority issue: the nexus and reasonable foresee-
ability tests.281 The Ninth Circuit then confusingly endorsed not one of the tests 
described above, but both of them, stating that it would “apply[] both the nexus 
and reasonable foreseeability tests to [the student’s] speech.”282 In so doing, 
the Ninth Circuit defined the nexus test as one that determines whether the stu-
dent’s speech is “closely tied to the school.”283 The Ninth Circuit found that 
the nexus test was satisfied because (a) all of the individuals involved had been 
 
270  Id. at 1064–65. 
271  Id. at 1067. 
272  The Ninth Circuit did also briefly discuss the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Porter, noting 
that the Fifth Circuit had not adopted any particular threshold test for the scope of school 
authority. Id. at 1068–69. 
273  Id. at 1068. 
274  Id. 
275  Id. 
276  Id. at 1069. 
277  Id. 
278  Id. 
279  C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2016). 
280  Id. 
281  Id. at 1149. 
282  Id. at 1150. 
283  Id. 
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students; (b) the speech had taken place just beyond school property; and (c) 
the speech had taken place just after the school day ended such that the school 
had an interest in student well-being as they were beginning their trips 
home.284 
The Ninth Circuit also determined that the reasonable foreseeability test 
had been satisfied because “administrators could reasonably expect the har-
assment’s effects to spill over into the school environment” and “be disruptive 
for affected students.”285 In that regard, the Ninth Circuit seems to have misap-
plied the Second Circuit’s “reasonable foreseeability” test. As a threshold test 
to determine the scope of school authority over off-campus speech, the reason-
able foreseeability test is designed to determine whether off-campus speech 
would be discoverable by school officials, not whether the speech would be 
disruptive to the school environment. The Ninth Circuit skipped that inquiry 
altogether and proceeded directly to find that the off-campus speech was fore-
seeable to cause a disruption. 
In its most recent decision, McNeil v. Sherwood School District, the Ninth 
Circuit has muddied the waters even more.286 In McNeil, the court determined 
that school officials had appropriately disciplined a student who had written a 
“[H]it [L]ist” identifying students and school staff that the student determined 
“Must Die.”287 The student had written the Hit List in a journal that he had kept 
in his bedroom at home.288 About four months after the student wrote the Hit 
List, his mother found the list in the student’s room and shared it with a thera-
pist, who then determined that she was obligated as a mandatory reporter to 
report the matter to the police.289 After the student was expelled from school, 
he filed suit alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights.290 
At the trial court level, the federal district court had determined that school 
officials had authority to discipline the student for his off-campus speech under 
both the nexus and reasonable foreseeability tests.291 In particular, the court 
found that the nexus test applied to any student off-campus speech where the 
content of the speech was related to school, even if the manner of communica-
tion—a private journal that was kept in the student’s room—might otherwise 
indicate a lack of school authority.292 In that regard, the decision in McNeil 
 
284  Id. at 1150–51. 
285  Id. at 1151. 
286  C.L.M. ex rel. McNeil v. Sherwood Sch. Dist. 88J, 918 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2019). 
287  Id. at 704. 
288  Id. 
289  Id. 
290  Id. at 705. 
291  C.L.M. ex rel. McNeil v. Sherwood Sch. Dist. 88J, No. 3:15-cv-01098-SB, 2016 WL 
8944450, at *7–*9 (D. Or. Dec. 30, 2016). In a later decision, the federal district court 
adopted the report and recommendation of a magistrate judge and granted the defendants’ 
motions for summary judgment, giving rise to an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. C.L.M. ex rel. 
McNeil v. Sherwood Sch. Dist. 88J, No. 3:1-cv-1098-SB, 2017 WL 2129301, at *1–2 (D. 
Or. May 16, 2017). 
292  C.L.M., 2016 WL 8944450 at *7. 
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seems directly at odds with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Porter, where the 
court determined that school officials lacked the authority to discipline a stu-
dent for a sketch that depicted violence at school. In issuing its decision, how-
ever, the trial court did not distinguish Porter on its facts, and only noted that 
Porter was a Fifth Circuit case and that its reasoning had not been adopted by 
the Ninth Circuit.293 
Also of note in the McNeil trial court decision was the district court’s for-
mulation of the nexus test. While the Ninth Circuit in C.R. had defined the 
nexus test as an inquiry of whether the student’s speech was “tied closely 
enough to the school to permit its regulation,”294 the federal district court in 
McNeil used substantially more diluted language, stating that the nexus test 
would not permit discipline for off-campus speech “not relating to the 
school.”295 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision that disci-
pline had not violated the student’s First Amendment rights.296 In its decision, 
however, the Ninth Circuit created a new type of nexus test. The court stated: 
“[C]ourts considering whether a school district may constitutionally regulate 
off-campus speech must determine, based on the totality of the circumstances, 
whether the speech bears a sufficient nexus to the school.”297 This new nexus 
test, which is supposed to be “flexible and fact-specific,”298 should consider the 
following factors: “(1) the degree and likelihood of harm to the school caused 
or augured by the speech, (2) whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the 
speech would reach and impact the school, and (3) the relation between the 
content and context of the speech and the school.”299 
The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in McNeil thus adds another layer of complexity 
and confusion. In the Ninth Circuit, the reasonable foreseeability threshold test 
has become but one consideration of a multi-factored nexus test for determin-
ing school authority over students’ off-campus speech.300 And the Ninth Cir-
cuit also chose to use vague language about the central inquiry of nexus, i.e., 
connection, between the speech and school. Rather than repeating the “closely 
tied” language that it had used in C.R., the Ninth Circuit noted that nexus exists 
merely if “the content of the speech involved the school.”301 
Also of note is the court’s rejection of the student’s argument “that he had 
no intent to communicate [his private writings] to anyone” and, indeed, had not 
done so.302 In that regard, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in McNeil radically de-
 
293  Id. at *3 n.3. 
294  C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene Sch. Dist., 835 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2016). 
295  C.L.M., 2016 WL 894450 at *7. 
296  C.L.M. ex rel. McNeil v. Sherwood Sch. Dist., 918 F.3d 700, 712 (9th Cir. 2019). 
297  Id. at 707. 
298  Id. 
299  Id. (citations omitted). 
300  Id. 
301  Id. at 710. 
302  Id. at 708. 
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viates from the prior precedent of all prior federal circuit court decisions, 
where the student’s manner of distributing off-campus speech was highly rele-
vant to the court’s ruling.303 
It is quite clear that the Ninth Circuit was particularly concerned about the 
fact that the student’s speech was a “credible, identifiable threat of school vio-
lence,”304 and with good reason. Indeed, the court properly recognized that, 
when faced with such threats, school administrators are obligated to act in or-
der to protect the school community.305 However, the Ninth Circuit’s broad 
definition of “nexus” as any speech that involves school, together with a rejec-
tion of the argument that private speech is beyond school authority, raises the 
thorny question of how this newly described nexus test is to be appropriately 
applied in cases of non-violent student speech.306 
For the lower federal courts, the lack of a consistent framework to address 
the scope of school authority over students’ off-campus electronic speech has 
been frustrating. One Pennsylvania federal district court noted the existence of 
“discord” and “divi[sion]” within the courts regarding the question of how to 
apply Tinker’s substantial disruption test to a student’s off-campus speech.307 
In that case, one involving a student’s social media posting about a bomb at 
school, the court stated, due to the unsettled state of the law, it would under-
take to decide the case only “with considerable apprehension and anxiety.”308 
This apprehension and anxiety is notable in judicial rulings involving dif-
ferent forms of students’ electronic expression, ranging from social media 
posts on Facebook and Instagram to electronic expression that is stored on a 
student’s cell phone. As discussed below, the courts have varied widely in their 
approaches even in cases with very similar facts. 
B. Discipline of Student Off-Campus Speech That Threatens Violence 
Invariably is Deemed to be Constitutional 
Although the federal circuit courts have adopted widely varying frame-
works to address school administrators’ ability to review student online ex-
pression and impose discipline, there is one issue on which the courts nearly 
 
303  S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee’s Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 779 (8th Cir. 
2012); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565, 571 (4th Cir. 2011); D.J.M. ex rel. 
D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647 F.3d 754, 765 (8th Cir. 2011); Doninger v. 
Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Ed., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 
2007). 
304  C.L.M., 918 F.3d at 708. 
305  Id. at 710. 
306  Indeed, given that the Supreme Court has created specific, content-based exceptions to 
students’ First Amendment rights, such as the prohibition on the use of lewd or obscene 
speech at school, the courts simply should adopt a clear-cut rule that any credible threat of 
school violence is subject to potential discipline whenever it comes to the attention of school 
officials. See Shaver, supra note 104, at 1581–82. 
307  R.L. v. Cent. York Sch. Dist., 183 F. Supp. 3d 625, 635 (M.D. Pa. 2016). 
308  Id. at 630, 635. 
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uniformly agree. Student speech—electronic or otherwise—that threatens vio-
lence to the school community will be subject to school authority and disci-
pline.309 As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in McNeil is perhaps 
most emblematic of courts’ firm convictions that school officials always are 
authorized to take action whenever they are made aware of a credible threat of 
violence. 
In any event, when the student’s speech involves a threat against the 
school community, students almost uniformly fail to establish that a constitu-
tional violation occurred.310 It does not matter if the speech is a picture on In-
stagram311 or other social media posting.312 It does not matter whether the court 
applied the reasonable foreseeability test,313 nexus test,314 or just a “circum-
stance-specific inquiry.”315 The courts consistently will find that any student 
speech that could reasonably be perceived as a threat to the school community 
is subject to discipline of school officials.316 
 
309  See, e.g., C.L.M., 918 F.3d at 710. 
310  McKinney v. Huntsville Sch. Dist., 350 F. Supp. 3d 757, 763, 766 (W.D. Ark. 2018) 
(student who posted a picture on Instagram of himself wearing a trench coat and holding an 
AR-15 rifle was constitutionally subject to school discipline); A.N. ex rel. Niziolek v. Upper 
Perkiomen Sch. Dist., 228 F. Supp. 3d 391, 394 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (student subject to school 
discipline for an Instagram video posting of a school shooting, with a caption that read 
“[s]ee you next year, if you’re still alive”); C.L.M. ex rel. McNeil v. Sherwood Sch. Dist. 
88J, No. 3:15-cv-01098-SB, 2016 WL 8944450, at *9 (D. Or. Dec. 30, 2016); R.L., 183 F. 
Supp. 3d at 639 (school authority existed over a student’s Facebook post that made refer-
ence to a bomb having been placed at school); N.Z. v. Madison Bd. of Educ., 94 N.E.3d 
1198, 1201–02, 1212 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017) (students who had participated in social media 
postings on a messaging app called “Kik” were subject to school discipline for having dis-
cussed the possibility of a school shooting (a “Klebold Surprise,” named after one of the 
Columbine shooters, Dylan Klebold)). 
311  McKinney, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 763. 
312  R.L., 183 F. Supp. 3d at 639; N.Z., 94 N.E.3d at 1202. 
313  McKinney, 350 F. Supp. 3d at 766–67; R.L., 183 F. Supp. 3d at 635, 639. 
314  C.L.M., 2016 WL 8944450 at *7. 
315  N.Z., 94 N.E.3d at 1212. 
316  See J.R. ex rel. Redden v. Penns Manor Area Sch. Dist., 373 F. Supp. 3d 550, 559 (W.D. 
Pa. 2019) (“[F]ederal courts have uniformly agreed that language reasonably perceived as 
threatening school violence is not constitutionally protected—whether such language is 
written or oral, and whether it occurs at school or elsewhere.”). The student speech should 
constitute a credible threat to the school community. For example, in Burge v. Colton 
School District, 100 F. Supp. 3d 1057, 1060 (D. Or. 2015), a middle school student estab-
lished that his First Amendment rights had been violated after he was disciplined for off-
campus statements he had posted on social media. The student complained that he wanted to 
“start a petition to get [his teacher] fired,” id., that the teacher was “the worst teacher ever,” 
id., and that she was “just a bitch.” Id. After a friend responded “XD HAHAHAHA!!,” id. 
(“XD” is a laughing emoticon. See What Does XD Mean?, SLANGIT.COM, 
http://slangit.com/meaning/xd [https://perma.cc/GAQ8-U95T] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019)), 
the student wrote, “[y]a haha she needs to be shot.” Burge, 100 F. Supp. 3d at 1060. School 
officials argued that the student’s speech constituted a “true threat.” Id. at 1068. The court 
rejected that argument, noting that many facts indicated the lack of any belief that the 
speech was threatening, particularly the fact that the student’s suspension was served at 
school and no law enforcement had been called. Id. at 1064. 
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C. The Courts Are Inconsistent in Their Approaches to Different Forms of 
“Speech,” Particularly Photographs and Activity on Social Media 
Platforms 
Although the courts have taken a consistent approach in student-speech 
cases involving potential threats to the school community, the courts struggle 
to apply existing precedent to other types of student speech. In some cases, the 
courts struggle with the scope of authority over a student’s off-campus speech. 
In other cases, the courts struggle to apply speech precedents to new and dif-
ferent forms of speech. 
For example, in Shen v. Albany Unified School District,317 a California 
federal district court decided a case involving an Instagram account that con-
tained racially divisive material. A high school student had created the Insta-
gram account that featured posts “target[ing] fellow [] students and school per-
sonnel with racist and derogatory comments, often with a picture identifying 
the target.”318 The pictures that were posted had been taken at school and, in 
some cases, altered with the addition of curse words or other images, including 
items like a noose.319 The student invited several friends to join the Instagram 
account.320 These other students responded by either commenting on or liking 
the posts made by the account’s creator.321 At least one student who had access 
to the account neither commented on nor liked any of the posts during the time 
that the account was active.322 
Several months after the Instagram account was created, it came to the at-
tention of African American students whose images appeared in the pictures.323 
As news of the contents of the Instagram account spread throughout the high 
school, students became increasingly agitated, and it was this agitation at 
school that brought the existence of the Instagram account to the attention of 
school officials.324 School officials ultimately decided to expel the student who 
had created the account, while the other students were suspended for different 
periods of time depending on their level of involvement.325 The students then 
filed suit alleging a violation of their First Amendment rights. 
The court first considered whether the students’ activity on the Instagram 
account qualified as “speech” under the First Amendment. Citing Bland v. 
Roberts, the court held that the acts of posting, commenting on, or even just 
“liking” the material that had been posted on Instagram did constitute expres-
 
317  Shen v. Albany Unified Sch. Dist., No. 3:17-cv-02478-JD, 2017 WL 5890089 (N.D. 
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sive activity.326 The court stated: “This action broadcasts the user’s expression 
of agreement, approval, or enjoyment of the post, which is clearly speech pro-
tected by the First Amendment.”327 
The court then concluded that school officials had authority to institute 
discipline under either the reasonable foreseeability or nexus test.328 The nexus 
test was satisfied because the pictures posted to Instagram had been taken at 
school and were picture of specific African American students.329 The court 
also found that the nature of the postings and the number of students with ac-
cess to the account made it reasonably foreseeable that the students’ speech 
would come to the attention of school authorities.330 Indeed, as to online 
speech generally, the court stated: “[I]t is common knowledge that little, if 
anything, posted online ever stays a secret for very long, even with the use of 
privacy protections.”331 
The court next addressed the question of whether discipline had been 
properly imposed on the students under Tinker. As to the student who had cre-
ated the account, taken the pictures at school, and authored the posts on the ac-
count, the court found that his speech had created a substantial disruption un-
der Tinker.332 Thus, his First Amendment rights had not been violated by the 
imposition of discipline.333 
The court then divided the remaining student-plaintiffs into two groups: 
one group consisted of those students who had commented on or liked posts 
that targeted specific African American students, and the other group consisted 
of students who commented on or liked posts that were racially divisive with-
out identifying or targeting specific students.334 As to the first group of stu-
dents, the court found that Tinker was satisfied because these students had 
“meaningfully contributed to the disruptions at [school] by embracing [the] 
posts . . . .”335 In addition, the court determined that the discipline of these stu-
dents was constitutional under Tinker because the students’ speech had inter-
 
326  Id. at *5; see also M.L. ex rel. Longoria v. San Benito Consold. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 
1:17-cv-00160, 2018 WL 5629941 (S.D. Tex., Oct. 31, 2018) (adopting report and recom-
mendation of magistrate judge, who found that high school cheerleader’s act of liking posts 
on social media was a form of protected speech); M.L. ex rel. Longoria v. San Benito Con-
sold. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 1:17-cv-160, 2018 WL 6288142, at *1, *6–*7 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 31, 
2018) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge). 
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fered with the rights of other students “to be secure and to be let alone.”336 By 
commenting on or liking the Instagram posts that had identified and targeted 
specific students, the court found that this first group of students had “imper-
missibly interfered” with the rights of other students to have a safe learning 
environment.337 
However, the court determined that the second group of students could not 
be disciplined due to their acts of commenting on or liking the Instagram posts 
that had not targeted specific students. The court distinguished the conduct of 
these students on the ground that this third group of students had made com-
ments or liked only a particular type of post, ones that did not, in the court’s 
words, “target[] specific individuals at [the school],”338 stating: 
Endorsement or encouragement of speech that is offensive or noxious at a gen-
eral level differs from endorsement or encouragement of speech that specifical-
ly targets individual students. The former is much more akin to the “merely” of-
fensive speech that is beyond the scope of Tinker. Although some of these 
plaintiffs’ conduct may have been experienced as hurtful and unsettling by 
classmates, the Court cannot say that their involvement affirmatively infringed 
the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.339 
Finally, the court briefly concluded that these same students, by comment-
ing on or liking racially divisive posts that did not specifically target other stu-
dents, had not “contributed to” the disruptions that were present at school 
based on the conduct of the other students who had posted, commented on, or 
liked material on the Instagram account.340 Thus, they could not be disciplined 
under Tinker. 
The court’s ruling in Shen can be contrasted with an earlier decision of a 
Tennessee federal district court, in which the court found that school officials 
had no authority to discipline a student for a series of tweets posted on Twitter 
that targeted a specific student.341 In Nixon v. Hardin County Board of Educa-
tion, a middle school student was disciplined by school officials for having 
posted on Twitter numerous comments about another student.342 The plaintiff’s 
comments initially were in response to a posting from a friend, who was 
threatening violence against a third student as part of a fight about a boy-
friend.343 In one tweet, the plaintiff had stated, “[g]ood [l]uck. Shoot her in the 
face.”344 In another tweet, the plaintiff had stated, “I hate her. That was my 
whole point . . . . I’m funny. I’ll kill her.”345 
 
336  Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969)). 
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School officials disciplined the plaintiff by sending her to an alternative 
school for a forty-five-day period, which later was reduced to ten days.346 She 
then filed suit alleging a violation of her First Amendment rights. After review-
ing the decisions of the Second, Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, the 
court determined that the student’s First Amendment rights had been violated 
because school officials had no authority over the off-campus speech.347 Spe-
cifically, the court rejected an argument that discipline was appropriate be-
cause the plaintiff had “used a social media platform to make negative and of-
fensive comments about a classmate.”348 The court also stated that the 
student’s speech lacked a sufficient “connection,” i.e., nexus, to school as 
would allow school officials to assert authority over her off-campus speech.349 
Indeed, the only connection to school was “the fact that both the speaker and 
the target of the speech studied there.”350 The fact that the off-campus speech 
involved a dispute between two students attending the same school alone was 
not sufficient to vest school officials with authority to discipline the student for 
her off-campus speech. 
Some recent cases involving student speech involve social media posts, 
but not ones that identify or are directed at other students. This set of cases in-
volves students’ use of vulgar or sexually charged material on social media. 
Again, the courts struggle to find a consistent approach. In A.F. v. Kings Park 
Central School District,351 several students were given a one-day suspension 
for having received a text message from another student that contained a video 
of two minor students engaged in sexual activity. School administrators con-
cluded that, among other violations of the school’s disciplinary code, all of the 
students who had received the text message had violated the disciplinary code 
by improperly possessing obscene material and engaging in “inappropriate use 
of an electronic device.”352 Two students were suspended even though they 
had immediately deleted the video after determining its contents; these two 
students filed suit alleging, among other claims, a First Amendment retaliation 
claim.353 
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The court acknowledged that all of the activity related to the text message 
had taken place outside of school,354 yet found that the students had no First 
Amendment claim because the video could be classified as child pornography 
that was not subject to First Amendment protection.355 Absent from the discus-
sion, however, was the question whether school administrators had any author-
ity to discipline students for being the recipients of a form of speech rather 
than the speaker, or whether authority of school officials even extends to inap-
propriate social media use by students that occurs completely outside of 
school. 
That latter issue has been tested in a recent series of three cases that all in-
volved cheerleaders.356 In each case, a high school cheerleader was dismissed 
from the cheerleading squad for social media posts that primarily contained 
obscene words. One cheerleader had posted an eight-second video on Snapchat 
in which several cheerleaders were singing the lyrics of Big Sean’s song 
“I.D.F.W.U.”357 Another cheerleader who was angry about not having been se-
lected for the varsity squad posted, also on Snapchat, a picture of herself (out 
of school on a Saturday in street clothes) with a middle finger raised and text 
that read: “fuck school fuck softball fuck cheer fuck everything.”358 In the last 
case, the cheerleader had made ten posts on Twitter that had some expletives 
and sexual innuendo.359 
In each of the three cases, school officials suspended the students from the 
cheerleading squad for having violated policies about use of social media.360 
Two of the federal district courts properly concluded that school officials had 
no authority to discipline students for off-campus vulgar speech posted on a 
social media account.361 In each case, the court rejected an argument that Fra-
ser should be extended to permit discipline by school officials for lewd or ob-
scene speech that occurs outside of school.362 Responding to the school’s ar-
gument that the speech had come onto campus by way of screenshots shown to 
school officials by other students, the court stated: “[E]ven if the screenshots of 
Plaintiff’s ten social media posts made their way to the school setting, online, 
 
354  Id. at 193. 
355  Id. at 200. 
356  B.L. ex rel. Levy v. Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 3d 429, 432 (M.D. Pa. 
2019); M.L. ex rel. Longoria v. San Benito Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 1:17-cv-00160, 
2018 WL 5629941, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 31, 2018); S.J. ex rel. Johnson v. Cache Cty. Sch. 
Dist., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1308 (D. Utah 2018). 
357  S.J., 323 F. Supp. 3d at 1309. “I.D.F.W.U.” stands for “I don’t fuck with you.” Id. 
358  B.L., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 433. 
359  Longoria, 2018 WL 5629941, at *1–2. 
360  B.L., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 433; Longoria, 2018 WL 6288142, at *1; Johnson, 323 F. Supp. 
3d at 1310. 
361  B.L., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 432; Longoria, 2018 WL 5629941 at *4. 
362  B.L., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 441–42 (holding that school has no educational mission to pro-
hibit off-campus vulgarity); Longoria, 2018 WL 5629941 at *4. 
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off-campus lewd speech ‘does not mutate into on-campus speech’ and remains 
protected under the First Amendment.”363 
The third case involved the eight-second video posted on Snapchat in 
which cheerleaders were singing Big Sean’s song. In that case, on a motion for 
a preliminary injunction to have the student reinstated to the cheerleading 
squad, the federal district court found that the student had not demonstrated a 
likelihood of success on the merits of her First Amendment claim.364 While 
noting that the student’s discipline had been based on facts other than just the 
mere language used in the video (namely “insubordination” under the discipli-
nary code and failing to take responsibility for her actions), the court stated the 
following: 
This case raises very interesting First Amendment issues for our social media 
age. . . . Are there students across the country using profanity on social media? 
Yes. Are some of those students cheerleaders? Yes. Do those cheerleaders have 
the absolute right to remain on the cheer squad without consequences for such 
posts when they are sent to other students at the school? This court cannot an-
swer that question clearly and unequivocally yes, especially in the factual sce-
nario in which S.J. made her post.365 
Thus, unlike the other two decisions, the federal district court was unwilling to 
find that the student’s posts to social media, which took place off-campus and 
outside of school, were beyond the purview of school officials.366 
Finally, the federal courts have struggled to apply school speech prece-
dents in cases involving either photographs posted by students or even simply 
stored on their cellphones. In a case out of the Northern District of Indiana, a 
federal judge sided with two girls who were suspended from their extra-
curricular activities as a result of sexually suggestive photographs that they had 
taken at a slumber party and posted on their social media accounts.367 The ac-
tion against the girls was taken after another student’s parent had discovered 
the photographs online and complained to the superintendent that the social 
media postings were causing a rift on the volleyball team.368 At issue for the 
judge was not only whether the conduct depicted in the photographs constitut-
ed expression for First Amendment purposes, but also whether the decisions to 
take the pictures and then post them online were expressive acts protected by 
the First Amendment. Each of these three decision points, the judge ruled, 
were expressive acts that fell under the scope of First Amendment protection: 
I conclude that whether the punishment of T.V. and M.K. was based on the acts 
depicted in the photographs, the taking or existence of the images themselves, 
 
363  Longoria, 2018 WL 5629941 at *4 (quoting J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 
915, 940 (3d Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., concurring)). 
364  Johnson, 323 F. Supp. 3d at 1322. 
365  Id. at 1321. 
366  Id. at 1322. 
367  T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 772, 784 (N.D. 
Ind. 2011). 
368  Id. at 772. 
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or the posting of the photographs to the internet, each of those possibilities qual-
ifies as “speech” within the meaning of the First Amendment.369 
The court also concluded that the discipline of the plaintiffs for their off-
campus social media postings violated the First Amendment.370 
In another case, a Pennsylvania federal court considered whether school offi-
cials violated the student’s First Amendment rights by reviewing her text mes-
sages and photographs after her phone was confiscated pursuant to the school’s 
cellphone use policy.371 In N.N. v. Tunkhannock Area School District, the stu-
dent filed suit alleging that her First and Fourth Amendment rights had been 
violated by school officials who disciplined her based on semi-nude and nude 
photographs that she had taken of herself and sent to a boyfriend.372 The pho-
tographs had been discovered by the school principal who, upon receiving the 
confiscated phone from a teacher, proceeded to review the stored photographs 
on the phone.373 The court noted the following relevant facts: “The photo-
graphs were taken off school property, were saved to the cell phone, were nev-
er emailed or uploaded to the internet, and were not shared with other students. 
To access the photographs, which are not immediately visible, school officials 
must have ‘clicked’ on at least three ‘menu’ selections.”374 The student’s 
phone was turned over to law enforcement officials, who threatened to, but ul-
timately never did, charge the student with a felony.375 Rather, the school and 
law enforcement officials required the student to complete a sexual violence 
and victimization course.376 Thereafter, the student filed suit against the school 
district and others alleging a violation of her First and Fourth Amendment 
rights.377 
The school district settled with the student shortly after it was filed, but the 
case proceeded against individual and municipal defendants, who filed motions 
 
369  Id. at 777. 
370  Id. at 785. 
371  N.N. v. Tunkhannock Area Sch. Dist., 801 F. Supp. 2d 312, 313 (M.D. Pa. 2011). The 
conduct of school officials spawned numerous related lawsuits. See, e.g., Miller v. Mitchell, 
598 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 2010); Miller v. Skumanick, 605 F. Supp. 2d 634, 637 (M.D. Pa. 
2009). 
372  N.N., 801 F. Supp. 2d at 314–15. The case was filed by the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion (ACLU) on the student’s behalf. See ACLU Settles Student-Cell-Phone-Search Lawsuit 
with Northeast Pennsylvania School District, AM. CIV. LIB. UNION (Sept. 15, 2010), https:// 
www.aclu.org/news/aclu-settles-student-cell-phone-search-lawsuit-northeast-pennsylvania-
school-district [https://perma.cc/D9RX-QUZP]. The ACLU has been active in litigating the 
issue of searches of students’ cellphones, litigation that has resulted in the adoption by some 
school districts of policies that limit the scope of any such searches. See Amy Vorenberg, 
Indecent Exposure: Do Warrantless Searches of a Student’s Cell Phone Violate the Fourth 
Amendment?, 17 BERKLEY J. CRIM. L. 62, 86 (2012). 
373  N.N., 801 F. Supp. 2d at 314. 
374  Id. 
375  Id. at 315. 
376  Id. 
377  Id. 
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to dismiss all claims.378 The court denied motions for judgment on the plead-
ings, finding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a violation of her First 
and Fourth Amendment rights.379 Thereafter, the remaining defendants also 
settled with the plaintiff, a settlement that included a monetary payment to the 
plaintiff.380 Because of the settlement, the court did not render a final decision 
on the merits of the student’s First Amendment claim. 
A Mississippi federal district court reached the opposite conclusion in a 
case that also was filed by a student who had been disciplined at school after 
school officials reviewed photographs stored on his cellphone.381 In J.W. v. 
DeSoto County School District, the cellphone of a seventh-grader was confis-
cated because he brought it to school and used it in violation of school poli-
cy.382 The teacher who confiscated the cellphone searched the photographs 
stored on the phone and discovered photographs—taken by the student at home 
in his bathroom—that school officials deemed to be evidence of use of “gang” 
symbols.383 The student contended that the photographs were nothing more 
than childish dancing and posing in the bathroom mirror.384 
The student filed suit alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights 
only; he did not assert any violation of his First Amendment rights.385 The 
court granted motions to dismiss filed by individual defendants and one munic-
ipal defendant, although the school district itself remained a defendant in the 
case.386 In considering the extent of the student’s privacy rights under the 
Fourth Amendment, the court in J.W. stated, without citation to any authority, 
that “[the] student’s decision to violate school rules by bringing contraband on 
campus [i.e., the cellphone] . . . appropriately results in a diminished privacy 
 
378  Id. (noting that the case was filed on May 10, 2010); see also AM. CIV. LIB. UNION, su-
pra note 375 (announcing settlement in September 2010). 
379  N.N., 801 F. Supp. 2d at 315. 
380  Stipulated Order of Dismissal at 5, N.N. v. Tunkhannock Area Sch. Dist., 801 F. Supp. 
2d 312 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (No. 3:10-CV-01080) (indicating a $10,000 payment directly to 
plaintiff and an additional $10,000 payment to the ACLU). 
381  J.W. v. Desoto Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 2:09-cv-00155-MPM-DAS, 2010 WL 4394059, at 
*1 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 2010). 
382  Id. 
383  Id. 
384  See id. 
385  Id. at *3. The Fourth Amendment inquiry regarding searches of a student’s person or 
belongings by school officials is examined under a two-part test established by the Supreme 
Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985). First, the search must be justified 
at its inception, which essentially requires that school officials have reasonable grounds to 
believe that the student violated the rules of the school. Id. at 341–42. Second, the scope of 
the search must be reasonably related to the grounds for instituting the search in the first 
place. Id. at 341. Searches may not be excessive in terms of the nature of the infraction. Id. 
at 342. 
386  J.W., 2010 WL 4394059, at *9. As to the municipal defendant, the court found that the 
plaintiff had not alleged that city employees had undertaken any search of the phone; rather, 
it was the school district employees who had searched the phone. Id. at *3. Thus, no Fourth 
Amendment claim could be asserted against the municipal defendant. 
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expectation in that contraband.”387 The court also minimized the extent of 
school officials’ review of the cellphone’s contents, characterizing their deci-
sion “to merely look at the photos on [the student’s] cell phone” as a limited 
intrusion into the student’s privacy.388 
Nonetheless, the court’s opinion was not wholly in favor of the school dis-
trict’s actions. In dicta, the court noted that it had “serious concerns regarding 
the school district’s actions in this case.”389 In particular, the court expressed 
concern that the district had taken disciplinary action against the student not 
based on the minor offense of bringing his cellphone to school, but based on 
school officials’ interpretation of the meaning of photographs taken by the stu-
dent in the privacy of his home and stored on the phone.390 In that regard, the 
court stated: 
Public actors step upon a very slippery slope when students are expelled on this 
basis, particularly if the school district’s opinions in this regard are based large-
ly upon subjective impressions of a student’s private activities off school 
grounds. The slope is even slippier [sic] when, as here, the school district only 
obtained the evidence of these activities by conducting a search which, while 
not unconstitutional, does tread into a constitutionally sensitive area.391 
Indeed, the court concluded by suggesting that the school district settle the 
case, stating that the district should “recognize that there are limits . . . upon 
the power of school officials to police the private lives of their students.”392 
And, in fact, the district did settle the case.393 
Given the court’s apparent concern that discipline was imposed due to a 
student’s private, unpublished, and off-campus activities, it is possible that the 
court would have reached a different conclusion had the plaintiff asserted a vi-
olation of his First Amendment right to engage in off-campus speech that is 
beyond the reach of school officials’ authority. In any event, the case high-
lights the difficulty of applying school speech precedents to cases involving 
photographs taken by students while not at school that, due to being stored on a 
mobile device that is carried to school, come to the attention of school authori-
ties. 
 
387  Id. at *5. 
388  Id. (emphasis added). The court granted motions to dismiss filed by school district em-
ployees on qualified immunity grounds. Id. at *7. 
389  Id. at *9. 
390  Id. at *6 (expressing “serious concerns regarding the wisdom and legality of the school 
district’s decision to expel [the student] based on its subjective impressions of photographs 
depicting him in his personal life.”). 
391  Id. at *9. 
392  Id. at *9 n.5. 
393  See Order Dismissing Action by Reason of Settlement, J.W. v. Desoto Cty. Sch. Dist., 
No. 2:09-cv-00155-MPM-DAS, 2010 WL 4394059 (N.D. Miss. Nov 1, 2010) (No. 
2:09CV155-M). 
46 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL[Vol. 20:Error! Reference source not found. 
IV. THEMES AND IMPLICATIONS 
Parts II and III of this article have highlighted the developing law around 
the electronic speech of both educators and students. While the analysis of em-
ployee speech is significantly different than the analysis of student speech, 
some larger themes do emerge in both educator and student speech cases. This 
Part explores some of those themes and their applications to student and educa-
tor speech, respectively. 
A. Scope of Authority 
The ubiquitous nature of social media has brought into focus the question 
of the school’s scope of authority to regulate speech that students and teachers 
create and distribute outside of school. In this area, there is a significant differ-
ence between students and employees. There is no question that Pickering al-
lows the state, as an employer, the authority to discipline public educators for 
expressive conduct, regardless of where the speech occurs. Marvin Pickering 
composed his letter outside of school and, had it disrupted the school, he may 
have legally faced job-related discipline. Even prior to the Internet and social 
media, the location of the employee speaker has never been the focus of the 
courts. Instead, the primary considerations are the nature of the content and the 
capacity within which the employee was speaking. 
By contrast, most of the student-speech cases in the digital age focus heav-
ily on the in-school versus out-of-school nature of the student’s speech and 
whether school officials have authority to discipline students for speech creat-
ed and distributed outside of school.394 Focus on this issue has led to the prolif-
eration of “threshold” tests to address the scope of authority issue and, in re-
cent cases, a “kitchen sink” approach where a court will adopt all varieties of 
threshold tests and apply them to the facts.395 The current approach lacks a 
firm analytical foundation and inevitably leads to confusion on the part of pub-
lic school administrators about their ability to discipline students for off-
campus speech. Thus, public-school administrators considering disciplinary 
action against students for online, off-campus speech should be aware of the 
law within their own federal circuit. Other than speech involving a credible 
threat of violence to the school community, there is little guidance for school 
administrators regarding the scope of their authority to act. 
 
394  See, e.g., C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 
2016) (framing the legal issue as one involving scope of authority over students’ off-campus 
speech); R.L. v. Cent. York Sch. Dist., 183 F. Supp. 3d 625, 636 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (“The 
main quandary of federal courts is whether Tinker applies to student speech that occurs off-
campus at all . . . .”). 
395  See C.R., 835 F.3d at 1150 (holding that both a nexus and a reasonable foreseeability 
test can be applied); N.Z. v. Madison Bd. of Educ., 94 N.E.3d 1198, 1212 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2017) (applying fact-specific inquiry, nexus test, and reasonable foreseeability test). 
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B. The Concept of Disruption Differs between Educators and Students 
Whether student or educator speech is at issue, the concept of disruption is 
a critical consideration. For educator speech, the Court has explicitly and ex-
pansively defined disruption. In Pickering, there is granular guidance as to 
when employee speech might be disruptive enough to merit discipline. Under 
Pickering, public employers may legally take action against an employee when 
evidence exists that the employee’s expression interfered with school opera-
tions, impeded the employee’s ability to perform his job duties, or constituted a 
willful or reckless false statement.396 Further, under Pickering, speech that 
breaches confidentiality or undermines superior/subordinate relationships can 
subject an employee to workplace discipline.397 The Court even allowed that, 
in some cases, a public educator might engage in expression “so without foun-
dation as to call into question his fitness to perform his duties in the class-
room.”398 
These guidelines for evaluating the disruptive impact of employee speech 
do not change based upon whether the speech occurs on or off campus. Rather, 
the concept of disruption in the realm of educator speech appears to have no 
in-school/out-of-school boundary. More important is the underlying notion that 
a public educator should demonstrate a basic level of mental and moral fitness 
to serve as a teacher, caretaker, role model, or disciplinarian. Thus, the Third 
Circuit concluded that Natalie Munroe’s blog postings about commentary that 
she wished to add to students’ report cards was disruptive under Pickering be-
cause, by directing such invective towards her students, she had become unable 
to effectively do her job.399 The Seventh Circuit similarly found that a high 
school guidance counselor/girls’ basketball coach who self-published a rela-
tionship book for women that was full of misogynistic and racist stereotypes 
was legally fired under Pickering because the community justifiably lost con-
fidence in his fitness to effectively coach or counsel their children.400 
In addition, public employees lose constitutional protection when they 
speak as an employee on a matter of private concern or pursuant to their job 
duties, and in such a situation, they may be legally disciplined irrespective of 
whether the speech was disruptive. Nonetheless, it is always the most prudent 
course for school administrators to evaluate the disruptive impact of the speech 
on a case-by-case basis before making any negative employment decision. In 
cases involving online speech, the Connick and Garcetti threshold tests have 
not been frequently used by courts to disqualify employee speech—and in the 
 
396  Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572–73 (1968). 
397  Id. at 570 n.3. 
398  Id. at 573 n.5. 
399  Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 473–74 (3d Cir. 2015). 
400  See Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist., 736 F.3d 1110, 1113–14, 1120–21 (7th Cir. 
2013); see also Duke v. Hamil, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1293–34 (N.D. Ga. 2014) (a deputy 
police chief was demoted after posting an image of a confederate flag with the caption “time 
for the second revolution” the morning after President Obama’s reelection). 
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cases where employees have prevailed on free speech claims, it has generally 
been the result of the employer failing to document disruption.401 
The concept of disruption in the student-speech realm, by contrast, has de-
veloped quite differently. In Tinker, the Court held that student speech that 
creates a material or substantial disruption or invasion of the rights of others 
may be disciplined by the school, but it did not give a great deal of guidance 
about exactly what would constitute such a disruption.402 Over time, the courts 
have determined that a substantial disruption occurs in a variety of contexts, 
including when teachers may be “incapable of teaching or controlling their 
classes” because of the student’s speech,403 when the “educational responsibili-
ties” of school administrators are interrupted to respond to a student’s 
speech,404 or even when a student’s speech leads to a breakdown of a “civil and 
respectful atmosphere” that is part of an orderly school day.405 
However, in the context of off-campus speech, the courts have struggled 
with the contours of actual or forecasted disruptions within the school envi-
ronment.406 The result is a compilation of rulings that, in many cases, are high-
ly inconsistent with one another. One such example is the Fifth Circuit’s deci-
sion in Bell, where the court found that school officials could have forecasted 
that the student’s rap song would lead to a future disruption.407 Engaging in ra-
ther hyperbolic language, the Fifth Circuit found that a future substantial dis-
ruption exists whenever a student’s off-campus speech disparages a teacher (or 
coach) because the speech would interfere with the educational process and, 
without education, there would be “little, if any, civilization.”408 
The Bell decision stands in contrast to the Third Circuit’s decisions in two 
cases that involved discipline of two students who created disparaging fake so-
cial media profiles of school principals.409 Under both sets of facts, the ability 
of a school official to be effective at school arguably had been impacted, but 
the courts differed greatly in their treatment of the off-campus speech. While 
 
401  See Wudtke v. Bieber, No. 16-C-260, 2017 WL 2274475 (E.D. Wis. May 24, 2017); see 
also Mattingly v. Milligan, No. 4:11CV00215 JLH, 2011 WL 5184283 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 
2011). 
402  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). 
403  Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001). 
404  Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 51–52 (2d Cir. 2008). 
405  Requa v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1280 (W.D. Wash. 2007). 
406  See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 399 (5th Cir. 2015); Kowalski v. 
Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain 
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930 (3d Cir. 2011); Nixon v. Hardin Cty. Bd. of Educ., 988 F. 
Supp. 2d 826, 836 (W.D. Tenn. 2013). 
407  Bell, 799 F.3d at 400. 
408  Id. at 399–400. This position was roundly criticized in the dissenting opinion of Judge 
Dennis, who characterized the majority’s position as converting the Tinker disruption in-
quiry into a “toothless” standard. Id. 
409  J.S., 650 F.3d at 930–31; Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 
205, 216 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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the Fifth Circuit predicted that student off-campus speech that disparages410 a 
teacher or coach might lead to the end of civilization, the Third Circuit simply 
found that, in the absence of a disruption at school, students’ off-campus 
speech, even speech that mocks or disparages a school official, is not subject to 
discipline.411 
Another example is the Ninth Circuit’s decision in C.R., where the court 
conflated the issue of whether off-campus speech was reasonably foreseeable 
to come to the attention of school officials with the issue of a reasonable fore-
cast of future disruption. The court held that the reasonable foreseeability test 
was satisfied because school officials could have seen that the off-campus 
speech would “spill over” into the school environment.412 Indeed, the Ninth 
Circuit posited that merely seeing one of the “harassers” in the school hallway 
could be “disruptive” to a student.413 
Other courts have taken a “hands-off” approach, as in the Nixon case, 
where the court found that text messages by one student that arguably threat-
ened another student were not subject to school discipline because they had 
been exchanged outside of school and did not cause any disruption.414 A Cali-
fornia federal court similarly determined that school officials had not been able 
to demonstrate the existence of disruption resulting from a YouTube video in 
which several high school students made derogatory and disparaging remarks 
about another student.415 In finding that school officials had failed to demon-
strate either an actual or forecasted disruption, the court noted that school dis-
cipline cannot be imposed because one student is embarrassed, has hurt feel-
ings, or otherwise may not want to attend class.416 The court also declined to 
 
410  It is true that the Fifth Circuit characterized the student’s rap song as threatening, harass-
ing, or intimidating speech, not merely disparaging speech. However, in a dissenting opin-
ion, Judge Dennis criticized the use of such “content-based” and “vague” terms that were 
wholly opinion based. Bell, 799 F.3d at 412–13. On the facts of the case, it is highly ques-
tionable whether the coaches referenced in the student’s rap song felt that they had been 
threatened, harassed, or intimidated. See Shaver, supra note 104, at 1588 (discussing partic-
ular facts that demonstrated the lack of any reasonable belief that the student had threatened, 
harassed, or intimidated the coaches). 
411  J.S., 650 F.3d at 931. 
412  C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1151 (9th Cir. 2016). 
413  Id. The Ninth Circuit did find that the students’ speech was subject to discipline under 
Tinker’s “rights of others” prong, although the court’s analysis under that prong is question-
able as well. The court found that the rights of the students who had been subject to the sex-
ually charged speech were impinged upon because school officials had questioned those 
students about the speech, causing them to feel uncomfortable. Id. at 1152. The court also 
found that “[t]he school could . . . reasonably expect that those [uncomfortable] feelings 
would cause [the student] to feel less secure in school.” Id. In other words, it was the ques-
tioning of school officials that created the uncomfortable feelings that might have—in the 
future—caused the student to feel less secure. 
414  Nixon v. Hardin Cty. Bd. of Educ., 988 F. Supp. 2d 826, 839 (W.D. Tenn. 2013). 
415  See J.C. ex rel. R.C.  v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1122 
(C.D. Cal. 2010). 
416  Id. at 1117, 1121. 
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defer to school officials, who claimed the need to impose discipline in order to 
protect the “emotional well-being of its young students.”417 
Thus, while both Pickering and Tinker relied heavily on the concept of dis-
ruption to or interference with the work of school, the application of those con-
cepts to off-campus electronic speech differs greatly between educators and 
students. While public educators are never able to shed the mantle of “teacher” 
and enjoy truly unencumbered free speech rights, in the case of student speech, 
the issue is much less clear. In the context of student speech, school adminis-
trators will have to carefully consider the facts of any particular case and pro-
ceed with the understanding that they have no good guidelines to follow. 
C. Employee and Student First Amendment Rights May Differ Based on the 
Content of the Speech 
Generally, the rights of children are more limited in scope than those of 
adults.418 This, however, doesn’t hold true for online, off-campus speech—
where the scope of authority of the state to regulate off-campus employee 
speech is more clearly established than the scope of authority of the state to 
regulate off-campus student speech. Further, the notion of mental or moral 
“fitness” is one that only applies in the employment context. As a result, stu-
dents may have stronger First Amendment rights with regard to certain topics, 
namely lewd or sexually suggestive speech and racially divisive speech. 
Fraser established that students may be disciplined for speech that is lewd 
or vulgar when that speech occurs at school or a school function, but not when 
that speech occurs online and off-campus.419 Thus, students ought to be able to 
engage in lewd and sexually suggestive speech in online, off-campus forums, 
so long as the speech does not target a specific student.420 Although certain re-
cent decisions might undercut the clear distinction between on-campus and off-
campus lewd speech,421 generally, students maintain the right to use foul lan-
guage or sexual innuendo in their off-campus communications. 
Employees, on the other hand, may well be subject to job-related disci-
pline when they post material that is lewd; such speech is very likely to un-
dermine the employee’s fitness or effectiveness, thus becoming disruptive to 
institutional efficacy under Pickering. For example, the “hypersexualized” na-
 
417  Id. at 1121–22. 
418  See James G. Dwyer, Equality Between Adults and Children: Its Meaning, Implication, 
and Opposition, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1007, 1011 (2013). 
419  See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); see also Klein v. Smith, 635 
F. Supp. 1440, 1441 (D. Me. 1986) (student’s vulgar gesture to teacher off campus was not 
subject to school authority). 
420  See, e.g., T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 776, 
783–84 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (holding that school had no authority to discipline high school girls 
who posted photographs online that showed students using toy props in the form of sexual 
organs). 
421  S.J. ex rel. Johnson v. Cache Cty. Sch. Dist., 323 F. Supp. 3d 1301, 1320–21 (D. Utah 
2018). 
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ture of Bryan Craig’s book in the Rich Township School District case “loomed 
large” in the Seventh Circuit’s finding that his speech was disruptive to his 
ability to effectively function as a school guidance counselor.422 While lewd, 
vulgar, or sexually explicit speech is dangerous for public educators, it may be 
less so for other public employees. Although a federal district court in Indiana 
upheld the dismissal of a Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA) volunteer 
in 2018 after she self-published a book detailing her experiences as a phone-
sex worker and linked it to her Facebook page, the Seventh Circuit subsequent-
ly reversed the lower court’s decision, finding no evidence that the book had 
resulted in any workplace disruption.423 
With racially insensitive speech, the legal calculus also may be different 
depending upon whether the speaker is a student or employee. Courts are al-
most certain to uphold negative employment consequences for public employ-
ees who engage in such expression, regardless of whether the speech is di-
rected toward individuals in the school community, or if it is simply a general 
expression of a racist world view. For example, in Snipes v. Volusia County, 
the Eleventh Circuit upheld disciplinary action taken by the county against one 
of its beach patrol officers, who had posted racially insensitive comments and 
sent racially insensitive texts in the aftermath of the Trayvon Martin killing in 
2012.424 In Geer v. Altiere, a federal district court in Ohio upheld disciplinary 
action against a deputy sheriff in Trumbull County after the sheriff disparaged 
Freddie Gray, an African American who died in the custody of Baltimore Po-
lice, allegedly as a result of excessive force.425 And in Duke v. Hamil, a deputy 
chief’s posting of the Confederate flag in response to President Obama’s 
reelection was enough to justify his demotion.426 
But when students are away from school, their First Amendment rights 
seem to clearly encompass an ability to express themselves in a racially insen-
sitive manner. Unlike public employees, there is no concept of “fitness” that 
would allow school administrators to take action against students for simply 
expressing racist opinions outside of school. As noted in Shen, school authori-
ties can only discipline students for this type of speech when it qualifies as ma-
terially disruptive under Tinker.427 While racist student speech may be upset-
ting to many within the school environment, it isn’t likely to trigger the level of 
disruption required under Tinker unless the speakers threaten or otherwise tar-
get individuals or groups of students. The Instagram account created by the 
 
422  Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist., 736 F.3d 1110, 1119 (7th Cir. 2013). 
423  Harnishfeger v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-03035-TWP-DLP, 2018 WL 1532691, at 
*1–*2 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2018), aff’d in part rev’d in part No. 18-1865, 2019 WL 6486869 
(7th Cir. Dec. 3, 2019). 
424  Snipes v. Volusia Cty., 704 F. App’x. 848, 850, 853–55 (11th Cir. 2017). 
425  Geer v. Altiere, No. 4:16CV2213, 2018 WL 1535232, at *5–*6 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 
2018). 
426  Duke v. Hamil, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1293, 1303 (N.D. Ga. 2014). 
427  Shen v. Albany Unified Sch. Dist., No. 3:17-cv-02478-JD, 2017 WL 5890089, at *11 
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2017). 
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students in Shen featuring altered photographs of minority students with pro-
fane language and violent images is an example of the type of student speech 
that targets and disrupts the school community in a way that would make it ac-
tionable by the school. Merely expressing a noxious racist point of view is not 
enough.428 
D. The Courts Take an Expansive View of Speech for First Amendment 
Purposes 
The nature of social media has forced the courts to explore not only the 
words that are written, but other means of online expression, such as “liking” 
certain posts or pages, sharing other persons’ posts, or posting pictures online. 
The question some courts have considered is whether the person who “likes” 
something is more akin to an audience member who claps when another is 
speaking—think of Mr. Fraser’s speech—or an actual speaker.429 Whether the 
case involves student speech or educator speech, the courts have developed a 
fairly expansive view of what constitutes “speech” for First Amendment juris-
prudence. 
In Bland v. Roberts, the Fourth Circuit dealt squarely with whether “lik-
ing” content on social media constituted an expressive act for First Amend-
ment purposes.430 The court explained that, once a person understands what it 
means to “like” content on social media, “it becomes apparent that his conduct 
qualifies as speech.”431 “In the context of a political campaign’s Facebook 
page,” the court opined, “the meaning that the user approves of the candidacy 
whose page is being liked is unmistakable.”432 In Shen, the court cited Bland in 
the context of student speech, specifically addressing the question whether stu-
dents who liked content on Instagram could be subject to discipline.433 While 
the Fourth Circuit has determined that “liking” content on Facebook is an ex-
pressive act, no court has yet weighed in on the act of “retweeting” content on 
Twitter. Whether or not a Twitter user who “retweets” content created by an-
other Twitter user is necessarily endorsing that expression is a point of disa-
greement among Twitter users, but it might be prudent for school administra-
 
428  Id. at *2, *10. 
429  See, e.g., Alicia D. Sklan, @socialmedia: Speech with a Click of a Button? #So-
cialSharingButtons, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTER. L.J. 377, 389 (2013) (arguing that 
“[l]iking a Facebook page [] is core speech”). 
430  Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 384–85 (4th Cir. 2013). In Bland, when the case was 
appealed to the Fourth Circuit, Facebook filed an amicus curiae brief arguing that Face-
book’s “like” feature was a form of communication that merited First Amendment protec-
tion. Brief for Facebook, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2, Bland v. Rob-
erts, 730 F.3d 368 (2013) (No. 12-1671); see also Ira P. Robbins, What is the Meaning of 
“Like”?: The First Amendment Implications of Social Media Expression, 7 FED. CTS. L. 
REV. 127, 144 (2013); Jorge R. Roig, Emerging Technologies and Dwindling Speech, 16 U. 
PENN. J. CONST. LAW 1235, 1235–36, 1236 n.7 (2013). 
431  Bland, 730 F.3d at 386. 
432  Id. 
433  Shen, 2017 WL 5890089, at *5–*6. 
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tors to assume that the voluntary nature of the act would render it speech under 
the First Amendment.434 
It is common for one individual to create content on social media, to which 
other individuals will react, either by commenting, liking, or posting memes or 
pictures. The difficult issue is not whether such activity is a form of expressive 
activity. The difficult issue is the degree of responsibility of each individual. In 
terms of weighing the legality of disciplinary action against students or em-
ployees who participate in these types of social media interactions, the courts 
have struggled to be able to distinguish levels of culpability among the speak-
ers. Indeed, the courts have applied different methods of analysis for students 
as opposed to employees. In Liverman, the Fourth Circuit treated the social 
media postings and comments of various public employees as a single expres-
sion of speech, whereas in Shen, the court treated the various comments and 
likes posted by students as separate expressions.435 
Treating the speech as separate expressions allows the court to support dif-
ferentiated consequences for different speakers, based upon their specific ex-
pressive conduct, as was the case in Shen. However, in the case of student 
speech, it might require a court to engage in a somewhat tortured analysis of 
the level of disruption caused by a student’s single act of liking the post of an-
other person. In the case of employee speech, treating an online discussion as 
one single expression for the purposes of the Connick analysis will mean that 
each individual who posted, commented, or liked will be treated the same. In 
Liverman, this approach turned out to be speech protective, where the elevated 
nature of one of the officer’s comments had the effect of pulling the second of-
ficer’s comments under the umbrella of protected citizen speech.436 Clearly, 
however, that may not always be the outcome. Thus, in the realm of speech 
that involves an individual’s act of merely “liking” someone else’s speech, the 
analysis could be thorny. 
That same difficulty also is present with expressive activity that consists of 
sharing pictures and videos online. Such activity is common practice for both 
students and adults, and often these images may memorialize conduct or oth-
erwise convey messages that are troubling to school administrators. A practical 
implication for school administrators is that they must take a broad view of 
what constitutes “expressive” conduct. If an image conveys a message that of-
fends or upsets school administrators, that, in and of itself, is a pretty strong 
indication that the conduct is “inherently expressive.”437 Before taking action 
 
434  See Frank E. Langan, Likes and Retweets Can’t Save Your Job: Public Employee Priva-
cy, Free Speech, and Social Media, 15 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 228, 244 (2018) (arguing that 
public employees can better protect their job interests by assuming that retweeting will be 
considered an expressive act). 
435  Liverman v. City of Petersburg, 844 F.3d 400, 410 (4th Cir. 2016); Shen, 2017 WL 
5890089, at *10. 
436  Liverman, 844 F.3d at 410. 
437  T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 776 (N.D. Ind. 
2011). 
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against conduct that is memorized in online photographs, administrators would 
be wise to consider whether the behavior is expressive in nature and, if so, 
whether there is a disruptive impact. 
E. Can Educators and Students Claim Their Speech is Political Hyperbole? 
When a public educator posts content online that might cast serious doubt 
upon his/her judgment, or provides evidence of prejudice against particular 
groups of students, employers and judges are forced to make evaluative judg-
ments as to whether the speech is so egregious that it serves as evidence of an 
educator’s lack of fitness to continue his or her duties. Just what sort of expres-
sion would disqualify one to continue as an educator is a calculus that is highly 
influenced by contemporary community values. In cases up until now, when 
public employees have engaged in expression online that disparages individu-
als or groups of students, it has generally been fatal to their free speech claims. 
But in 2019, the public seems to be increasingly divided regarding the question 
of how to distinguish between a lack of fitness and harmless hyperbole, partic-
ularly when it comes to social media.438 
There has been a coarsening of our public and political discourse, particu-
larly online. One of the nation’s highest profile users of social media, President 
Donald Trump, has pushed the boundaries of what the public does or does not 
view as appropriate online expression from a public figure. In April of 2018, 
Trump used his Twitter account to respond to Stephanie Clifford (a.k.a. 
Stormy Daniels), who had released a sketch of a man she claimed had threat-
ened her in order to keep her from publicly discussing her alleged affair with 
Trump.439 “A sketch years later about a nonexistent man,” tweeted the presi-
dent, “[a] total con job, playing the Fake News Media for Fools (but they know 
it)!”440 Believing that the President had publicly called her a liar, Daniels filed 
a civil case for defamation, which was dismissed in October of 2018. The 
judge agreed with the President’s argument that the tweet, even though it was 
“derogatory and disparaging,” was protected speech: “[T]he tweet in question 
constitutes ‘rhetorical hyperbole’ normally associated with politics and public 
discourse in the United States. The First Amendment protects this type of rhe-
torical statement.”441 
Even before the President relied upon this strategy to successfully get the 
Clifford defamation case dismissed, his Twitter feed had inspired another at-
torney to consider a “political hyperbole” defense for his high-profile client. 
 
438  The Supreme Court in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) used the phrase 
“political hyperbole” in holding that an individual could not be criminally prosecuted for 
having stated, in a discussion of police brutality and the Vietnam War draft: “If they ever 
make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J.” The Court found that 
those words constituted political hyperbole and not a true threat against President Lyndon 
Johnson. Id. at 706, 708. 
439   Clifford v. Trump, 339 F. Supp. 3d 915, 919 (C.D. Cal. 2018). 
440  Id. 
441  Id. at 925. 
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Disgraced pharmaceutical executive Martin Shkreli was free on a five-million-
dollar bail while awaiting sentencing after his conviction on three counts of 
fraud in August of 2017.442 In September of 2017, he posted an offer on Face-
book of a $5,000 payment in exchange to anyone who could “grab a hair” off 
of Hillary Clinton’s head as she embarked on a book tour.443 A federal district 
judge in Brooklyn stated the post “could be perceived as a true threat” and re-
voked Shkreli’s bail, sending him directly to jail.444 Shkreli’s attorney’s Ben-
jamin Brafman publicly argued that Shkreli’s tweet was simply a form of the 
same type of “political hyperbole” that President Trump engaged in throughout 
the 2016 campaign, citing specifically a Trump tweet attacking Hillary Clinton 
in which he referenced “Second Amendment people” as the only way to stop 
her if she were to be elected.445 
In March of 2018, Florida middle school teacher Dayana Volitich was re-
moved from her social studies classroom after her employers discovered that 
she had been hosting a “white nationalist podcast.”446 Through her lawyer, 
Volitich publicly stated that, in her podcast, which she did under a pseudonym, 
she was merely attempting to employ “political satire and exaggeration, mainly 
to the end of attracting listeners and followers, and generating conversation 
about the content discussed . . . .”447 Volitich never got to test this defense in 
court, however, because when an investigation showed that she had been de-
ceiving school administrators about what she’d been teaching in her classroom, 
she submitted her resignation.448 Although it hasn’t happened yet, it is reason-
able to speculate that an increasing number of public educators (and other pub-
lic employees) may attempt to defend their speech by claiming that it is politi-
cal or social hyperbole and therefore protected speech. 
As discussed supra, student-speech cases do not turn on a question of 
mental or moral fitness as cases involving employees often do. Therefore, stu-
dents may be less likely to raise a “political hyperbole” defense. Students 
 
442  Stephanie Clifford, Martin Shkreli is Jailed for Seeking a Hair from Hillary Clinton, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/business/dealbook/ 
martin-shkreli-jail.html [https://perma.cc/7X47-8A2H]. 
443  Id. 
444  Id. 
445  Renae Merle, Martin Shkreli Jailed After Facebook Post About Hillary Clinton, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/09/13/ 
martin-shkreli-apologizes-for-facebook-post-about-hillary-clinton/?utm_term=.8691a3f20 
fa6 [https://perma.cc/NE2N-T925]. 
446  Phil McCausland & Erik Ortiz, Florida School Removes Teacher Who Hosted White 




447  Id. 
448  Carly Zervis, Volitich Investigation Found Cause for Discipline: Teacher Disputes 
Findings, but Resignation Renders Null Any Punishment, CITRUS COUNTY CHRON. (May 2, 
2018), https://www.chronicleonline.com/news/education/volitich-investigation-found-cause-
for-discipline/article_c57e3f14-4e49-11e8-98bc-c7bff01a02cd.html. 
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sometimes seek to characterize their speech as attempts to be funny or sarcastic 
but, in the context of threatening speech, the courts have invariably rejected 
such attempts.449 Students also have not succeeded in claiming that off-campus 
speech that meets a definition of bullying was really nothing more than a 
joke.450 
The success of a “hyperbole” defense for student speech that is neither 
threatening nor bullying is less clear. The Third Circuit’s decision in J.S. 
demonstrates that such a defense sometimes can succeed. In J.S., the court 
ruled in favor of a student who created a hyperbolic and profane parody profile 
of his principal on MySpace, explaining that the speech was so outrageous that 
no reasonable reader would take it seriously.451 And it is clear that students’ 
right to engage in comedic expression, even if it is deemed “juvenile and silly,” 
is protected under the First Amendment.452 
CONCLUSION 
In the years since Pickering and Tinker were decided, our communicative 
technology has outpaced our First Amendment jurisprudence. The advent of 
the Internet and social media have created significant free speech challenges 
inside the public schools. As internet-based speech controversies have wound 
their way up the court system, some clarity has been gained about how the Su-
preme Court precedent is applied to online speech controversies in the public-
school setting. But educational practitioners continue to struggle to make deci-
sions related to personnel or student discipline that are consistently defensible 
in both the legal and ethical sense. As the title of this article suggests, signifi-
cant unanswered questions remain. 
As far as employee speech, the most significant unanswered questions 
concern the application of Connick to online speech. First and foremost is 
whether and how the Supreme Court will settle the split between the circuits 
regarding content versus context. Second, and more generally, will courts con-
tinue to bypass the public concern test in Connick in favor of balancing online 
speech of employees under Pickering? Will the Garcetti “pursuant to duty” 
threshold test gain more relevance in future cases? And will our coarsening po-
litical discourse eventually allow employees to successfully defend their con-
troversial online speech as “political hyperbole”? 
In terms of student speech, of course the most pressing unanswered ques-
tion involves the scope of school district authority to sanction students for their 
 
449  See, e.g., J.R. ex rel. Redden v. Penns Manor Area Sch. Dist., 373 F. Supp. 3d 550, 564 
(W.D. Pa. 2019) (collecting cases); R.L. ex rel. Lordan v. Cent. York Sch. Dist., 183 F. 
Supp. 3d 625, 639, 647 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (rejecting the student’s contention that he was jok-
ing); Yates v. Cobb Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 1:15-cv-3211-SCJ, 2016 WL 9444376, at *3, *13 
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2016). 
450  See, e.g., Dunkley v. Bd. of Educ., 216 F. Supp. 3d 485, 492 (D.N.J. 2016). 
451  J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920, 929 (3d Cir. 2011). 
452  T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767, 775 (N.D. Ind. 
2011). 
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off-campus expressions. Although almost all circuits that have heard such cas-
es have decided that the Tinker disruption standard can be applied to off-
campus student speech, there are significant discrepancies from circuit to cir-
cuit regarding when and how. This uncertainty may continue unless and until 
the Supreme Court weighs in. 
Amid this uncertainty, an overarching best practice recommendation for 
school administrators dealing with online speech controversies involving either 
students or employees is to always engage in a thorough and thoughtful eval-
uation of the disruptive impact of that speech, remembering that one’s own 
subjective reaction to the speech is not relevant. For employees, the definition 
of “disruptive” is spelled out by the Pickering Balancing Questions, which are 
easily applied to off-campus, online speech. For students, the analysis is less 
clear. Whether it’s students using social media to threaten or harass teachers or 
classmates, or educators sharing racist diatribes that prompt members of the 
community to question their fitness to teach, the problems generated for the 
public administrator are substantial. 
Ethical administrators aspire to protect the rights of both students and em-
ployees but must respond to student or employee speech in a way that protects 
safety, order, discipline, and achievement within the school. The principles 
outlined in this article will hopefully help both legal and educational practi-
tioners meet this challenge. 
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APPENDIX I: COURT OF APPEALS CASES INVOLVING PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND 
CYBER SPEECH 






Bland v. Roberts, 
730 F. 3d. 368 (4th 
Cir. 2013). 
Deputy sheriffs “liked” and 
made supportive comments 
on Facebook page of boss’s 
political opponent. 
No Yes Passed: no showing of 
disruption within sher-
iff’s office. 
Craig v. Rich Twp. 
High Sch. Dist., 
736 F.3d 1110 (7th 
Cir. 2013). 
High school guidance coun-
selor and girls’ coach self-
publishes sexually explicit 
self-help book for women. 
No Yes Failed: speech that 
objectified females 
would justifiably erode 
confidence and trust in 
employee as counselor. 
Graziosi v. City of 
Greenville, 775 
F.3d 731 (5th Cir. 
2015). 
Veteran police officer criti-
cizes chief’s decision to not 
send representative to of-
ficer funeral in neighboring 
city. 
No No N/A, but would have 
failed if speech had 
been deemed on public 
concern, due to disrup-
tion of working rela-
tionships. 
 







Howard Cty., 851 
F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 
2017). 
Paramedic comments on 
Facebook disparaging gun 
control and liberals. After 
being directed to remove 
comment, he complained 
about the social media poli-
cy. 
No Yes Failed: comment could 
cause dissent, discord, 
appearance of racial 




ready repealed portions 
of social media policy 
that were overbroad or 
vague, so that was 
moot. 
Harnishfeger v. 
United States, No. 
18-1865, 2019 WL 
6486869 (7th Cir. 
Dec. 3, 2019). 
 
VISTA volunteer writes 
book about previous expe-
rience as phone-sex worker 
and posted announcement 
and Amazon link on her 
Facebook page. 
No Yes Passed 
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Knopf v. Williams, 
884 F.3d 939 (10th 
Cir. 2018). 
Experienced city planner 
non-renewed by mayor 
after expressing le-
gal/ethical concerns regard-
ing a project with which he 
had some involvement in an 
email to city attorney. 
Yes N/A N/A 
LeFande v. District 
of Columbia, 841 
F.3d 485 (D.C. Cir. 
2016). 
Police officer fired for mak-
ing harsh and accusatory 
statements in emails to 
superiors. 
No – Court 
need not ad-
dress question, 
because it will 
fail Pickering 







Liverman v. City 
of Petersburg, 844 
F.3d 400 (4th Cir. 
2016). 
Two police officers engage 
in Facebook exchange ex-
pressing disapproval of 
promotion procedures. 
No Yes Passed: and social me-
dia policy was consid-
ered overly broad.* 
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Lumpkin v. Aransas 
Cty., 712 F. App’x 350 
(5th Cir. 2017). 
Paralegals were fired after 
private text messages with 
assistant county attorney 
were critical of bosses’ 
failure to resign while run-
ning for higher offices. 
Texts were captured in 
lawsuit between assistant 
county attorney and county 
attorney. 






Malin v. Orleans Par. 
Commc’ns Dist., 718 
F. App’x 264 (5th Cir. 
2018). 
Deputy Director of Orleans 
Parish Communication 
District accidently hits “re-
ply all” and sends email 
criticizing one of the board 
of directors. 
No No N/A 
Munroe v. Cent. Bucks 
Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 
454 (3d Cir. 2015). 
Teacher blogged disparag-
ing comments about stu-
dents 
No Yes Failed: invective 
directed at students 
undermined teach-
er effectiveness. 
Odermatt v. N.Y.C. 
Dep’t of Educ., 694 F. 
App’x 842 (2d Cir. 
2017). 
NYCTF (New York City 
Teaching Fellow) writes 
critical comments in 
NYCTF Facebook groups 
about “Relay,” the master’s 
program NYCTF had 
placed her with. After 
warnings, fellow writes 
email to NYCTF pushing 
back and was subsequently 
removed from the program. 
No No N/A 
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BALANCING TEST?  
Richerson v. Beck-
on, 337 F. App’x 
637 (9th Cir. 
2009). 
Curriculum specialist blogs 
insulting remarks about su-
pervisors and colleagues. 
No Assumed 




ships and personal 
effectiveness. 
Snipes v. Volusia 
Cty., 704 F. App’x 
848 (11th Cir. 
2017). 
Beach patrol supervisor fired 
for racially insensitive Face-
book posts and text messages 
(texts while on duty) in af-
termath of Trayvon Martin 
killing. 







Utter v. Colclazier, 
714 F. App’x 872 
(10th Cir. 2017). 
Substitute teacher suffers 
retaliation for Facebook sup-
port of bond election. 
No Yes Passed 
*Denotes employer’s social media policy ruled overbroad and vague. 
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Agyeman v. Roosevelt 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 
254 F. Supp. 3d 524 
(E.D.N.Y. 2017). 
Teacher sent series of 
internal emails express-
ing concerns about 
student discipline, con-
duct of district employ-
ees, district policies, 
lack of re-
sources/support, and 
alleged violations of 
law/policy. 
Yes N/A N/A 
Austin v. Preston Cty. 
Comm’n, No. 
1:13CV135, 2014 WL 
5148581 (N.D. W. Va. 
Oct. 14, 2014). 
County animal shelter 
director puts objection-
able posts on animal 
shelter Facebook page, 
refuses to give pass-
word to bosses. 
Yes N/A N/A 
Bailey v. Barrett, No. 17-
0937-CV-W-BP, 2018 
WL 2051513 (W.D. Mo. 
May 2, 2018). 
Public defender posts 
derogatory comments 
about supervisor on 
Facebook. 
No Yes Passed 
Bryant v. Vill. of Bald 
Head Island, No. 7:14-
CV-223-H, 2017 WL 
1194347 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 
30, 2018). 
Police officer fired for 
series of texts with co-
workers in which he 
discussed newspaper 
article written by su-
pervisor. 
No  Yes  Passed 
Cannon v. Vill. of Bald 
Head Island, No. 7:15-
CV-187-H, 2017 WL 
2712958 (E.D.N.C. June 
22, 2017). 
Four police plaintiffs 
fired for series of pri-
vate group text mes-
sages in which they 
were discussing news-
paper article written by 
supervisor as well as 
making jokes about co-
workers. 







speaking on a 
matter of pri-
vate interest. 
Passed: for 3 plain-
tiffs who passed 
public concern test. 
N/A for Cannon  
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Cochran v. City of 
Atlanta, 289 F. Supp. 
3d 1276 (N.D. Ga. 
2017). 
Employee publishes book 
criticizing homosexuality 
No Yes Failed 
Czaplinski v. Bd. of 
Educ., No. 15-2045 
(JEI/JS), 2015 WL 
1399021 (D.N.J. 
Mar. 26, 2015). 
School security guard posts 
about “black thugs” in-
volved in shooting of Phil-
adelphia police officer. 
No Yes Failed: comment impeded 
ability to do daily du-
ties/cast doubt upon her 
judgment and fairness. 
Duke v. Hamil, 997 
F. Supp. 2d 1291 
(N.D. Ga. 2014). 
Deputy Police Chief posts 
rebel flag and calls for sec-
ond revolution the morning 
after Obama’s re-election. 
No Yes Failed: speech communi-
cated racist ideology, 
which undermines public 
trust and confidence in 
law enforcement. 
Geer v. Altiere, No. 
4:16CV2213, 2018 
WL 1535232 (N.D. 
Ohio Mar. 29, 2018). 
Police officer in Baltimore 
posts negative post regard-
ing Freddie Grey in the 
aftermath of his death at the 
hands of Baltimore PD. 




2011 WL 5184283 
(E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 
2011). 
Public employee makes 
sympathetic remark on 
Facebook regarding fired 
co-workers. 
No Yes Passed: employer showed 
no evidence of disruption. 
Moreau v. St. Landry 
Par. Fire Dist. No. 3, 
No. 6:18-00532, 
2019 WL 4282696 
(W.D. La. Sept. 10, 
2019). 
Fire Department Chief crit-
icizes school board and fire 
department board on Face-
book post. 
No No N/A 
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WL 3142130 (N.D. 
Cal July 25, 2017). 
Public transportation law-
yer fired for posting 
“any[body] but [X] for city 
council” on Facebook. X 
was an agency employee 
who was also on the city 
council and known to be a 
marginal employee. 
No  Yes N/A 
Sampson v. City of 
Fort Smith, 255 F. 
Supp. 3d 873 (W.D. 
Ark. 2017). 




No  No N/A 
Snyder v. Mil-
lersville Univ., No. 
07-1660, 2008 WL 
5093140 (E.D. Pa. 
2008). 
Student teacher posts 
“drunken pirate” picture on 
MySpace page. 
No No N/A 
Spanierman v. 
Hughes, 576 F. 
Supp. 2d 292 (D. 
Conn 2008). 
Teacher interacts inappro-
priately with students on 
MySpace page. 




no role in 
decision to 
dismiss. 
N/A - but would have 
failed, disruption would 
have outweighed First 
Amendment value of 
speech. 
Thiede v. Burcroff, 
No. 16-13650, 2018 
WL 465968 (E.D. 
Mich. Jan. 18, 2018). 
Employee internal texts. No  No N/A 
Fall 2019] THE FIRST AMENDMENT 65  
 






Vincent v. Story Co., 
No. 4:12-cv-00157-
RAW, 2014 WL 
10007079 (S.D. Iowa 
Jan. 14, 2014). 
 
Employee in county at-
torney’s office “likes” 
Facebook post that is 
highly critical of findings 
clearing local police of-
ficers in the shooting of a 
family member. 
No Yes Failed - speech adversely 
impacted working rela-
tionships between county 
attorney, local police and 
attorney general offices. 
Wudtke v. Bieber, 
No. 16-C-260, 2017 
WL 2274475 (E.D. 
Wis. May 24, 2017). 
Police officer confronts 
sheriff candidate at cam-
paign picnic and asks 
questions, later responds 
to candidate’s Facebook 
post regarding the en-
counter. When candidate 
wins, officer ultimately 
must resign. 
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